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INTRODUCTION 
Across jurisdictions, one or both parties typically are unrepresented1 in a 
minority of filed general civil cases (3% to 48%), in a majority of domestic 
relations cases (35% to 95%), and in most cases in small claims and hous-
ing courts (79% to 99%).2  Whether unrepresented litigants are able to ob-
tain a fair result in litigation is a major concern, given their lack of informa-
tion about court forms and processes, lack of knowledge of substantive law 
and rules of evidence and procedure, and lack of case presentation and ne-
gotiation skills.3  Additional concerns are the potential burdens that large 
numbers of unrepresented parties might pose for court staff and judges.4 
                                                          
 1. This article uses the term “unrepresented” litigants; comparable terms include self-
represented, pro se, and pro per. 
 2. See, e.g., JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGA-
TION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 8 (1998); JOHN M. 
GREACEN, SELF REPRESENTED LITIGANTS AND COURT AND LEGAL SERVICES RESPONSES TO 
THEIR NEEDS 3-8 (2002), available at  http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/pdffiles/ 
SRLwhatweknow.pdf; NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, SELF-REPRESENTATION: PRO SE STA-
TISTICS (2006), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/wc/publications/memos/ 
prosestatsmemo.htm; Connie J. A. Beck & Bruce D. Sales, A Critical Reappraisal of Di-
vorce Mediation Research and Policy, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 989, 993 (2000); Debo-
rah J. Chase, Pro Se Justice and Unified Family Courts, 37 FAM. L.Q. 403, 404-05 (2003); 
Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to 
Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1359, 1390-91 
(1995);Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in 
New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 419, 420-21 (2001).  See generally BOSTON BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE 
ON UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS (1998), available at http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/reports/ 
unrepresented0898.pdf. 
 3. See ABA TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES 3 (2006) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE], available at https://www.abanet.org/ 
legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A112A.pdf; GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 2, at 52-54, 
118; GREACEN, supra note 2, at 12; LYNN MATHER ET AL., DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK: 
VARIETIES OF PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE 43-44, 67 (2001); BRUCE D. SALES ET AL., 
SELF-REPRESENTATION IN DIVORCE CASES 14 (1993); Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law 
Residency Program?: A Modest Proposal in Response to the Burdens Created by Self-
Represented Litigants in Family Court, 33 RUTGERS L. J. 105, 115 (2001). See generally 
BOSTON BAR ASS’N, supra note 2.  Lists of the tasks lawyers perform when representing 
clients indicate the skills that non-lawyers lack.  See, e.g., HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUS-
TICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION 90-91 (1990) [hereinafter KRITZER, 
JUSTICE BROKER]; MATHER ET AL., supra, at 67; Berenson, supra, at 130-31; Alicia M. Far-
ley, An Important Piece of the Bundle: How Limited Appearances Can Provide an Ethically 
Sound Way to Increase Access to Justice for Pro Se Litigants, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 563, 
569-71 (2007); Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling: Current Developments and Future Trends, 
40 FAM. CT. REV. 15, 16 (2002); Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary 
Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 
1080 (2000).  Research has found that even lawyers have difficulties when they litigate 
cases in settings different than those in which they usually practice. See, e.g., KRITZER, JUS-
TICE BROKER, supra, at 156-57; HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND 
NONLAWYERS AT WORK 201 (1998) [hereinafter KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY]; MATHER ET 
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 Proposals to enhance unrepresented civil litigants’ access to mea-
ningful justice can be grouped into three sets.  One set recommends that 
courts do more to facilitate unrepresented litigants’ ability to handle their 
cases themselves, such as by providing instructions, simplified forms, and 
increased assistance from court personnel or volunteers.5  Another set of 
proposals urges courts to provide alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) 
                                                                                                                                      
AL., supra, at 59.  Unrepresented litigants also are more likely than represented litigants to 
be “one-shotters” or “have nots” and, thus, might also lack other skills and resources. See, 
e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Le-
gal Change, in IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 13, 15, 22, 27 
(Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003); Donald R. Songer et al., Do the “Haves” 
Come Out Ahead over Time?, in IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 
85, 99, 102-103 (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003). 
 4. GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 2, at 52-54; GREACEN, supra note 2, at 9-12; Beck 
& Sales, supra note 2, at 993; Berenson, supra note 3, at 112-15; Paula Hannaford-Agor & 
Nicole Mott, Research on Self-Represented Litigation: Preliminary Results and Methodo-
logical Considerations, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 163, 165 (2003); see generally BOSTON BAR ASS’N, 
supra note 2; Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the Requirements of Judicial Neutral-
ity and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality When Parties Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solu-
tions, Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423 (2004). 
 5. See, e.g., BOSTON BAR ASS’N, supra note 2, at 2; CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES & 
CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, RESOLUTION II: In Support of a Leadership 
Role for CCJ and COSCA in the Development, Implementation and Coordination of Assis-
tance Programs for Self-Represented Litigants (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter CCJ/COSCA], 
available at http://cosca.ncsc.dni.us/Resolutions/CourtAdmin/resolutionSelfRepresented 
Litigants.html; GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 2, at 25, 68-71; GREACEN, supra note 2, at 
13; IOWA JUDGES ASS’N AND IOWA STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE JOINT TASK FORCE ON 
PRO SE LITIGATION 4-9 (2005) [hereinafter IOWA TASK FORCE], available at 
http://www.iowabar.org/miscdocuments.nsf/2b85a4ea12f4bfac8625669d006e27ab/2255cb2
54c1954af8625701b0061fc6f/$FILE/Pro%20se%20task%20force%20june%202005.pdf; 
MASS. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, BARRIERS TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN MASSACHUSETTS 4-
5 (2007) [hereinafter MASS. COMMISSION], available at http://www.massaccesstojustice.org/ 
reports-of-the-commission.php; N.H. SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON SELF-
REPRESENTATION, CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE: A REPORT ON SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN 
NEW HAMPSHIRE COURTS 13-18  (2004) [hereinafter N.H. TASK FORCE] available at 
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/prosereport.pdf; SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGATION 
NETWORK, BEST PRACTICES IN COURT-BASED PROGRAMS FOR THE SELF-REPRESENTED: CON-
CEPTS, ATTRIBUTES, AND ISSUES FOR EXPLORATION 3-18 (2006) [hereinafter SRLN], availa-
ble at http://www.ncsonline.org/WC/Publications/KIS_ProseBestPracticesSRLN.pdf; Be-
renson, supra note 3, at 122-33; Chase, supra note 2, at 414-18.  For empirical research on 
the effectiveness of these programs, see GREACEN, supra note 2, at 13-28; Russell Engler, 
Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When 
Counsel is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 81 (2010). 
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programs, particularly mediation, for unrepresented litigants.6  The third set 
of proposals focuses on increasing the availability of legal representation.7 
Proposals to expand legal representation generally are silent as to wheth-
er they envision providing counsel for ADR proceedings.  The ABA pro-
posal does address this issue, but different positions are expressed in differ-
ent documents.  In the report accompanying the ABA resolution, the provi-
sion of counsel is limited to fora that occur in the “litigation context” and in 
which the process is “adversarial.”8  In another document, however, the 
recommendation is to provide “a full range of services in all forums” in-
cluding, among others, “representation in negotiation and alternative dis-
pute resolution.”9 Thus, the ABA proposal presumably includes providing 
counsel for adversarial court-connected ADR proceedings like arbitration, 
although it is not clear whether it extends to “non-adversarial” court-
connected ADR proceedings like mediation or neutral evaluation.10 
                                                          
 6. See, e.g., BOSTON BAR ASS’N, supra note 2, at 2; MASS. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 
64; N.H. TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 19-21; Chase, supra note 2, at 421-22.  These pro-
posals typically cite relaxed rules of evidence and procedure and a less formal setting among 
the reasons why mediation would be a good forum for unrepresented litigants. 
 7. Many proposals in this third set aim to accomplish this through increased pro bono 
work, the unbundling of legal services, or limited-purpose representation. See, e.g., BOSTON 
BAR ASS’N, supra note 2, at 1; CCJ/COSCA, supra note 5; GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 
2, at 70; IOWA TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 10-16; MASS. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 5-10; 
N.H. TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 10-12; SRLN, supra note 5, at 20-25; Berenson, supra 
note 3, at 122-33; Chase, supra note 1, at 415-19.  By contrast, the ABA resolution that is 
the subject of the present Symposium urges the provision of counsel “at public expense to 
low income persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs 
are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody. . . .” 
ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 1. 
 8. ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 13.  The ABA’s focus on providing counsel in 
adversarial proceedings is consistent with Reuben’s discussion of litigants’ qualified right to 
counsel in ADR, based on his review of Supreme Court decisions: “[a] right to counsel has 
been held to be a requirement of due process when the hearing is of an adversarial nature . . . 
but it has not been found to be essential in hearings that are nonadversarial in nature.” Reu-
ben, supra note 3, at 1079. 
 9. ABA TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF A STATE SYS-
TEM FOR THE DELIVERY OF CIVIL LEGAL AID 1 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
legalservices/sclaid/atjresourcecenter/downloads/tencivilprinciples.pdf. 
 10. And because the report specifically excludes providing counsel in processes de-
signed primarily for use by unrepresented litigants, such as to resolve small claims and sim-
ple uncontested divorces, the ABA proposal presumably does not include providing counsel 
for any ADR proceedings in those contexts.  This apparently is based on the theory that 
lawyers are often excluded from these fora or are not needed for litigants to “quickly and 
effectively access legal rights and protections” because judges in these fora “take an active 
role in developing the relevant facts.” ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 13.  Empirical 
research in small claims and housing courts, however, raises serious questions about these 
assumptions. See, e.g., LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR BETTER HOUSING, NO TIME FOR JUSTICE: 
A STUDY OF CHICAGO’S EVICTION COURT 4 (2003), available at http://lcbh.org/images/ 
2008/10/chicago-eviction-court-study.pdf; Engler, supra note 5, at 50-51 & n.56; Roselle L. 
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In practice, however, there is no distinct line between “adversarial” and 
“non-adversarial” processes.  Although the mediation process itself may be 
considered non-adversarial, it often takes place in the middle of adversarial 
litigation.  In many courts, mandatory mediation is a formal step in the 
court management of litigation;11 if the parties do not settle in mediation, 
they are immediately back in the adversarial “litigotiation” process.12  Just 
as there is no clear separation between negotiation and litigation, there is no 
clear separation between mediation and either negotiation or litigation.13 
The assumption that representation is not needed in mediation appears to 
underlie proposals that exclude mediation from the processes for which 
counsel should be provided, as well as proposals that urge courts to provide 
mediation programs for unrepresented litigants.  Existing mediation pro-
grams, however, do not necessarily share this assumption. Some court-
connected programs routinely exclude cases with unrepresented litigants 
from mandatory referral to mediation, some refer only certain matters to 
mediation when one or both parties are unrepresented, and some require 
lawyers to accompany their clients in mediation.14  Other programs, how-
ever, have mandatory referral to mediation without regard to the parties’ 
representational status, and a few do not allow lawyers to attend mediation 
or permit the mediator to exclude lawyers.15 Thus, different  mediation 
programs appear to have reached different conclusions about the relative 
benefits and costs of representation versus lack of representation in media-
tion. 
                                                                                                                                      
Wissler, Mediation and Adjudication in Small Claims Court: The Effects of Process and 
Case Characteristics, 29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 323, 323-24, 335-37 (1995). 
 11. See John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Transform Each Other?, 24 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839 (1997) (describing the “liti-mediation” culture, where mediation is 
routinely integrated into litigation practice); Craig A. McEwen & Roselle L. Wissler, Find-
ing Out If It Is True: Comparing Mediation and Negotiation Through Research, 2002 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 131, 132-33 (2002); Roselle L. Wissler, The Effectiveness of Court-Connected 
Dispute Resolution in Civil Cases, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 55, 63, 72 (2004). 
 12. See Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About the Legal 
Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268 (1984); HERBERT M. KRITZER, The Lawyer as Negotiator: 
Working in the Shadows 2, 5, 15 (Univ. of Wis. Law Sch. Disputes Processing Research 
Program: Series No. 7, Working Paper No. 4, 1986). 
 13. Lande, supra note 11; see also KRITZER, supra note 12, at 19; Jean R. Sternlight, 
ADR Is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where it Fits in a System of Justice, 3 Nev. L.J. 
289, 294-95 (2003). 
 14. ROBERT J. NIEMIC ET AL., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR 40 
(2001); see also infra Part I.A. 
 15. See infra Part I.A; see also Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking 
Glass: Real Conversations with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and its 
Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 573, 611 (2004) (describing a special education med-
iation program that permitted non-lawyer advocates to attend mediation but excluded law-
yers). 
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The concerns about unrepresented parties in mediation include many of 
the same concerns that have been raised about unrepresented parties in liti-
gation and negotiation,16 plus additional concerns specific to the mediation 
process. Unrepresented parties might not understand how mediation oper-
ates, how it fits into the overall litigation process, or its potential advantag-
es or disadvantages when deciding whether or how to use mediation.17 Un-
represented parties might not be able to articulate or express their views or 
concerns during mediation.18  Mediators’ neutrality might be compromised 
if unrepresented parties seek their advice or support: unrepresented parties 
might feel the process is unfair if mediators do not assist them, and 
represented parties might feel it is unfair if they do.19  Unrepresented par-
ties might view the mediator as a court authority and feel pressured to set-
tle, or they might think that being required to mediate means they are re-
quired to settle.20  Unrepresented parties also might not have enough fac-
tual or legal information to evaluate the implications of settlement propos-
als in order to make a fully informed decision and, as a consequence, might 
accept a settlement that is unfair or does not adequately address their inter-
ests.21 
The effect of the presence of lawyers on the mediation process and out-
comes has been debated.22  Lawyers generally are thought to improve the 
effectiveness of mediation and their clients’ mediation experience by pre-
paring them for mediation and advising them on negotiation skills.23  Some 
commentators argue that lawyers are essential to ensure the fairness of the 
mediation process because they equalize power imbalances and counteract 
settlement pressures; others maintain that mediators can, and in some set-
                                                          
 16. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 17. Ctr. for Dispute Settlement and Inst. for Judicial Admin., NAT’L STANDARDS FOR 
COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS, § 1.4 & cmt. [hereinafter NAT’L STANDARDS], 
available at courtadr.org/files/NationalStandardsADR.pdf; NIEMIC ET AL., supra note 14, at 
56; Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 992; Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in 
Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 775, 778-80 (1999). 
 18. Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 1001; Farley, supra note 3, at 569. 
 19. NIEMIC ET AL., supra note 14, at 24; Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 1020.  A similar 
concern has been raised regarding judges’ impartiality with unrepresented litigants. GOLD-
SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 2, at 25-32; Zorza, supra note 4, at 423-25. 
 20. NAT’L STANDARDS, supra note 17, §§ 1.4, 11.1, 11.2 & cmts; NIEMIC ET AL., supra 
note 14, at 56; Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 1012. 
 21. NIEMIC ET AL., supra note 14, at 56;  NAT’L STANDARDS, supra note 17 § 1.4 & 
cmts.; Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 993-94, 1012, 1039-40. 
 22. See, e.g., NAT’L STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 10.2 & cmt.; ALFINI ET AL., MEDIA-
TION THEORY AND PRACTICE 412 (2001); Lande, supra note 11, at 890. 
 23. See infra Part I.B.1. 
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tings have a duty to, address these problems.24  Some commentators argue 
that lawyers are likely to dominate mediation sessions, thereby limiting the 
parties’ direct participation and transforming their discussions; others 
maintain that lawyers ensure that parties can communicate their concerns 
and are not silenced by the mediator or the other side.25  Some argue that 
lawyers make mediation more contentious and thereby reduce opportunities 
for problem-solving and relationship repair; others maintain that lawyers 
help keep the parties’ emotions in check and improve the tone of the ses-
sion.26  There is also disagreement about whether lawyers increase or re-
duce the likelihood of settlement in mediation.27  While some commenta-
tors argue that lawyers ensure against uninformed or unfair agreements, 
others maintain that mediators can help parties assess settlement proposals 
and, in some settings, have a duty to prevent unfair settlements.28 
Given the large proportion of unrepresented litigants and the widespread 
use of court-connected mediation, it is important to understand what effect 
representation, or conversely, the lack of representation, has on parties’ 
experiences in mediation as well as the process and its outcomes.29  To 
date, few empirical studies have examined these questions.30  This Article 
discusses the existing research findings and presents new data on the effect 
of representation in mediation.31 
This Article first describes the proportion of unrepresented parties in 
mediation and the policies and practices regarding representation in differ-
ent mediation contexts.  The core of the Article examines the empirical 
findings on the effect of representation on several dimensions of the media-
tion process, including the effect on preparation for mediation, party per-
ceptions of the fairness of the process and pressures to settle, the extent of 
party “voice” and participation in mediation, and the tone of the session.  In 
addition, the Article examines the effect of representation on mediation 
outcomes, including the likelihood of settlement and the fairness of agree-
                                                          
 24. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 25. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 26. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 27. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 28. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 29. See also Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 995. 
 30. See also Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 993, 1039 (noting that “we have no informa-
tion about whether having an attorney as an advisor has any bearing on . . . satisfaction le-
vels” and “almost no research has been conducted that even mentions pro se litigants, much 
less that assesses the effects of mediation on these litigants or the progress of their cases.”); 
McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1391. 
 31. This Article focuses on the effect of having a representative in mediation when the 
party attends mediation, not when the representative attends mediation instead of the party.  
See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: “The Problem” in 
Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 875-76, 894-95 (2008). 
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ments reached.  The studies find few differences consistently associated 
with representation, suggesting that unrepresented parties might face fewer 
problems in mediation—and lawyers might create fewer problems—than 
some claim.  The available research is too limited, however, to be able to 
conclude that lawyers either play an essential role in mediation or are not 
needed, or that they are particularly helpful or detrimental to the mediation 
process.  Additional findings show that how lawyers represent clients dur-
ing mediation is related to parties’ assessments of mediation and settle-
ment.  The Article concludes with a discussion of the findings, the limita-
tions of existing studies, and the additional research that is needed to in-
form policies and practices regarding representation in mediation. 
I.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS REGARDING REPRESENTATION IN MEDIATION 
This section of the Article presents the findings of the handful of studies 
that have examined the effect of representational status in mediation, pri-
marily in domestic relations and Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) 
cases. These findings are supplemented with new analyses of existing data-
sets involving court-connected domestic relations mediation and general 
civil mediation, which will be referred to throughout as “the present study” 
in domestic relations mediation and general civil mediation, respectively.32  
Before the findings are presented, the methodology and context of these 
two studies will be briefly discussed. 
The findings of the “present study” of domestic relations mediation are 
based on data collected as part of a study of mandatory mediation of con-
tested cases involving children in thirteen district and superior courts in 
Maine.33  All mediators,34 lawyers, and parties in cases mediated between 
                                                          
 32. Most of these analyses are reported for the first time in this article; a few have pre-
viously been reported in Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil 
Cases: What We Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641 (2002) 
[hereinafter Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation] and ROSELLE L. WISSLER, TRAPPING THE 
DATA: AN ASSESSMENT OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS MEDIATION IN MAINE AND OHIO COURTS 
(1999) [hereinafter WISSLER, TRAPPING THE DATA] (on file with author). 
 33. Mediation could resolve all contested issues, including property and financial issues.  
The mediator reported to the court whether the case was resolved and, if not, which issues 
remained and whether a hearing or an additional mediation session should be scheduled.  If 
the parties reached an agreement in mediation, a written agreement signed by the parties, or 
one drafted by their lawyers, formed the basis of an uncontested hearing.  If a full agreement 
was not reached, the parties would have a hearing on the unresolved issues. For more infor-
mation on the mediation program and study methodology, see WISSLER, TRAPPING THE DA-
TA, supra note 32, at 1-16. 
 34. At that time, the parties paid $120 to the court to cover up to two mediation ses-
sions; the court in turn paid the mediators, who served as independent contractors, a flat rate 
of $50 per session. The mediators had a median of nine years of mediation experience, had 
mediated a median of 300 domestic relations cases in the prior five years, and had com-
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February 1996 and March 1997 were asked to complete a questionnaire at 
the end of the mediation session.35  The analyses reported here were con-
ducted on the subset of 644 cases for which the questionnaires referred to 
the final mediation session.  Of the 849 parties, 84% had a lawyer; of those, 
97% said their lawyer attended their mediation.36 
The findings of the “present study” of general civil mediation are based 
on data collected as part of a study of a pilot mediation program in the gen-
eral division of five courts of common pleas in Ohio.37  All mediators,38 
lawyers, and parties were asked to complete a questionnaire at the end of 
the mediation session in a total of 688 cases mediated between 1997 and 
1998 in three courts in the first phase of the pilot program, and in a total of 
393 cases mediated between 1998 and 2000 in two courts in the second 
phase of the program.39  Almost three-fourths of the cases were referred to 
mediation by a judge, either at the request of one of the parties or on the 
judge’s own initiative;40 the rest were randomly assigned to mediation.  All 
litigants were represented;41 accordingly, these data could not be used to 
examine the effect of having a lawyer, but rather the effect of what the 
lawyers did while representing clients in mediation. The descriptive find-
ings presented here are the average for the five courts; the findings regard-
                                                                                                                                      
pleted a median of 106 hours of mediation training.  The highest degree held by most of the 
mediators (78%) was a bachelor’s or master’s degree; 7% had a law degree. 
 35. The overall response rate was 96% for mediators, 59% for parties, and 71% for law-
yers.  Whether parties completed a questionnaire was not related to mediator reports of 
whether the case had settled. 
 36. Unless otherwise noted, parties whose lawyer did not attend mediation were com-
bined with parties who did not have a lawyer for comparison with parties who had a lawyer 
in mediation. It is the lawyer’s presence in or absence from the mediation session that is 
thought to affect the mediation process and outcome on most dimensions.  See infra Parts 
I.B.2-4, C.1-2. 
 37. At that time, mediation was offered at no cost to the parties.  There were no financial 
penalties or disincentives for failure to reach a settlement, and the mediators reported to the 
court only whether the case settled. 
 38. All mediators were lawyers and were employed by the courts as half-time or full-
time mediators.  All mediators had over forty hours of general mediation training, and most 
also had over forty hours of training specifically in the mediation of civil cases. Some me-
diators had substantial experience mediating other types of cases; others had less mediation 
experience but had substantial civil litigation experience. 
 39. The mediators completed a questionnaire in each case included in the study.  De-
pending on the court, from 155 to 622 parties completed a questionnaire (for a completion 
rate of 77% to 87% in all but one court, where the rate was 49%).  Between 169 to 619 law-
yers per court completed a questionnaire (for a completion rate of 88% to 98% in all but one 
court, where the rate was 50%).  For the number of completed questionnaires and the re-
sponse rate for each court, see Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation, supra note 32, at 703. 
 40. These two groups of cases could not be distinguished in the first phase courts; in the 
second phase courts, about half of these cases were referred at party request. 
 41. Cases involving unrepresented litigants were excluded from the pilot mediation 
program.  See Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation, supra note 32, at 652 n.37. 
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ing the effect of what the lawyers did in mediation are the result of meta-
analyses.42 
A. How Many Parties Are Unrepresented in Mediation? 
 Few mediation studies reported whether parties were represented or un-
represented.  In those that did, the proportion of unrepresented parties va-
ried by the type of case and the jurisdiction, in part reflecting differences in 
policies regarding case eligibility for mediation and practices regarding 
lawyers’ attendance at mediation.  Because of these policies, the proportion 
of unrepresented parties in mediation was likely to be smaller than in all 
filed cases. 
 Across several studies of domestic relations mediation, the proportion of 
cases in which both parties were unrepresented ranged from 3% to 33%, 
and the proportion of cases in which only one party was unrepresented 
ranged from 17% to 26%.43  Cases in court-connected mediation are likely 
to involve fewer unrepresented parties than all filed divorce cases because 
courts generally mandate mediation only in contested cases, and parties in 
contested cases are less likely to be unrepresented.44  Whether lawyers ac-
company their clients to mediation depends on the policies and practices in 
specific jurisdictions.  Some courts prohibit the exclusion of lawyers from 
mediation; others permit mediators to exclude lawyers from mediation or to 
limit their participation during mediation.45  Even in jurisdictions where 
lawyers may attend mediation, they often do not.46 Accordingly, in domes-
                                                          
 42. Meta-analysis takes into consideration the strength, direction, and degree of statis-
tical significance of the effect found in each court and essentially averages the effects across 
the courts, providing measures that indicate the overall strength and direction of the effect 
(r) and its statistical significance (p). The meta-analytic methods used are those in ROBERT 
ROSENTHAL, META-ANALYTIC PROCEDURES FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 88-91 (4th prtg. 1989). 
 43. See, e.g., Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 994; Joan B. Kelly, Family Mediation Re-
search: Is There Empirical Support for the Field?, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 3, 6, 9-10 
(2004); McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1359.  In the present study, both parties were unre-
presented in 10% of cases, and one party was unrepresented in 18%. See also CTR. FOR FAM-
ILIES, CHILDREN & THE COURTS, DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS OF CLIENTS IN COURT-BASED CHILD 
CUSTODY MEDIATION 3 (July 2005), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/ 
cfcc/pdffiles/SUSRSDemoTrends.pdf (finding that at least one parent was unrepresented in 
69% of mediated cases in California in 2003). 
 44. McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1358, 1359 n.244, 1391. 
 45. SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE § 6:7 (2d ed. 2007-08 
cumulative supplement issued in Dec. 2007); McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1331.  Exclud-
ing lawyers from mediation, particularly when mediation is mandatory, is contrary to rec-
ommendations. See, e.g., UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT §10 (2001). See also Reuben, supra 
note 3, at 1095-96 (arguing that statutes excluding counsel from court-connected mediation 
would be unconstitutional); NAT’L STANDARDS, supra note 17, §§ 10.2, 11.3 & cmts. 
 46. See, e.g., McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1331, 1351-52; Suzanne Reynolds et al., 
Back to the Future: An Empirical Study of Child Custody Outcomes, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 
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tic relations mediation, there is not a simple distinction between 
“represented” and “unrepresented” parties, but an additional intermediate 
category of parties who have counsel but who do not have representation 
within the mediation session itself.47  Some divorce mediation statutes or 
court rules assign mediators the duty to warn parties of the risks of pro-
ceeding without counsel or to advise parties to seek independent legal ad-
vice or have a lawyer review settlement proposals before signing an agree-
ment.48 
 Studies of Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) mediation showed 
different patterns of the extent and type of representation in different set-
tings.  In a pilot mediation program involving several Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) offices, one party was unrepresented 
in 33% of cases, and both parties were unrepresented in 45% of cases.49  
Among represented parties, most charging parties and all responding par-
ties were represented by a lawyer; the remaining charging parties had union 
representation.50  In a transformative mediation program involving infor-
mal EEO complaints within the U.S. Postal Service, charging parties were 
unrepresented in one-third of cases, and responding parties were unrepre-
sented in two-thirds of cases.51  Among represented parties, only 5% of 
charging parties and 3% of responding parties were represented by a law-
yer; instead, they were primarily represented by a union representative or a 
fellow employee.52  Thus, in EEO mediation, the distinction is not only 
                                                                                                                                      
1634 (2007).  For instance, although 89% of parties in a study of Ohio domestic relations 
mediation had counsel, only 8% of those parties had a lawyer present during mediation. 
WISSLER, TRAPPING THE DATA, supra note 32, at 57.  Lawyers’ presence may depend, in 
part, on whether financial and property issues are permitted to be addressed in mediation. 
MATHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 75.  But even within a state, lawyers’ attendance at media-
tion varied widely, from fewer than 10% of cases to 98% of cases. McEwen et al., supra 
note 2, at 1331 n.72. 
 47. See also Hannaford-Agor & Mott, supra note 4, at 176. 
 48. McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1332-33, 1397-98, 1401-02, 1405-06, 1409. 
 49. CRAIG A. MCEWEN, AN EVALUATION OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION’S PILOT MEDIATION PROGRAM 43 (1994) (on file with author).  When only one 
party was represented, it was as likely to be the charging party as the responding party.  Id. 
at 50. 
 50. E-mail from Craig McEwen, Oct. 5, 2008 (on file with author). 
 51. Lisa B. Bingham et al., Exploring the Role of Representation in Employment Media-
tion at the USPS, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 341, 356, 364 (2002); Tina Nabatchi & 
Lisa B. Bingham, Transformative Mediation in the USPS REDRESS Program: Observations 
of ADR Specialists, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 399, 401-03 (2001). 
 52. Sixty-three percent of represented charging parties were represented by the union, 
and 20% were represented by a fellow employee; 45% of represented responding parties 
were represented by a fellow employee.  Bingham et al., supra note 51, at 364. The rate of 
legal representation in this setting might be lower because these were informal EEO com-
plaints, in contrast to the formal complaints mediated in the EEOC offices in the McEwen 
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between unrepresented and represented parties, but also between lawyer 
and non-lawyer representatives.53 
Studies of court-connected general civil mediation seldom report the 
proportion of unrepresented litigants.  Most programs exclude cases involv-
ing unrepresented parties from eligibility for mandatory referral to media-
tion54 and require lawyers to accompany their clients to mediation.55 Given 
these policies, few unrepresented parties are likely to appear in general civ-
il mediation;56 fewer than in all filed civil cases, and too few to allow us to 
examine the effects of representation. 
The reverse situation exists in small claims mediation: most cases in-
volve two unrepresented parties, even though they have the right to retain 
counsel in many jurisdictions.57  The proportion of unrepresented parties in 
small claims mediation is likely to be smaller than that in all filed small 
claims cases because mediation typically is available only in cases where 
both parties appear on the date of trial,58 and unrepresented parties are less 
likely than represented parties to appear in court to prosecute or defend the 
case.59  There tend to be too few represented parties to be able to examine 
the effects of representation in small claims mediation. 
                                                                                                                                      
study. Cf. MCEWEN supra note 49.  For other ways in which the USPS program differed 
from other EEO mediation programs, see infra note 91. 
 53. This distinction also applies in special education mediation and perhaps in other 
types of mediation as well.  See Peter J. Kuriloff & Steven S. Goldberg, Is Mediation a Fair 
Way to Resolve Special Education Disputes? First Empirical Findings, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 35, 55-56 (1997); Welsh, supra note 15. 
 54. ROBERT J. NIEMIC, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MEDIATION & CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN 
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 5-6 (1997); 
Wissler, supra note 11, at 71.  Cases involving unrepresented parties might enter court-
connected mediation at the agreement of both parties, but their numbers are likely to be 
small.  A few mediation programs arrange pro bono limited purpose representation so that 
otherwise unrepresented parties can participate in mediation. See, e.g., Joseph A. Torregros-
sa, Appellate Mediation in the Third Circuit – Program Operations: Nuts, Bolts and Prac-
tice Tips, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1059, 1080-81 (2002); see also NAT’L STANDARDS, supra note 
17, §§ 1.4, 4.2(c) & cmts. (recommending that courts not exclude all unrepresented litigants 
from mediation, but instead make a case-by-case determination of the parties’ ability to 
negotiate effectively). 
 55. NIEMIC ET AL., supra note 14, at 56; Wissler, supra note 11, at 63, 72. 
 56. See e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using 
Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. 
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 269, 277 (1999) (citing survey results that 75% of responding Florida 
courts reported that lawyers were present in all civil mediation sessions, and the remaining 
courts reported that lawyers were present in most sessions); Wissler, Court-Connected Med-
iation, supra note 32, at 657 (lawyers were present at mediation in virtually every case). 
 57. Wissler, supra note 11, at 56. 
 58. Id. at 56-57. 
 59. See Suzanne E. Elwell & Christopher D. Carlson, The Iowa Small Claims Court: An 
Empirical Analysis, 75 IOWA L. REV. 433, 443, 511 (1990). 
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B. What Effect Does Representation Have on the Mediation Process? 
1. Does Representation Enhance Party Preparation for Mediation? 
For parties’ participation in mediation to be informed and for the media-
tion process and outcome to be fair, parties need to understand what is like-
ly to happen during the mediation process, what the role of the mediator is, 
and that they can terminate mediation at any time.60  Parties who are more 
prepared for mediation are generally thought to have a better experience 
and a more productive session, and represented parties are presumed to be 
better prepared for mediation than unrepresented parties.61 
Little is known about unrepresented parties’ understanding of the media-
tion process, the role of the mediator, or how mediation fits into the larger 
litigation context.  Charging parties in EEO mediation, most of whom were 
unrepresented, often had unrealistic expectations about the process and 
possible outcomes.62  Parents interviewed before they participated in spe-
cial education mediation hoped that the mediator would, among other 
things, do the talking for them and persuade school officials to consider 
their views.63  Few of the parents were prepared to suggest or explore solu-
                                                          
 60. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 17, at 778-80; see also ABA MODEL STANDARDS OF 
PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION, Standard III.A (2001) [hereinafter ABA 
MODEL DIVORCE MEDIATION STANDARDS], available at http://www.afccnet.org/pdfs/ 
modelstandards.pdf; NAT’L STANDARDS, supra note 17, §§ 1.4, 3.1, 3.2, 11.2 & cmts.; ALFI-
NI ET AL., supra note 22, at 430; Welsh, supra note 15, at 657-58. 
 61. See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING MEDI-
ATION QUALITY, FINAL REPORT 10-11 (2008) [hereinafter MEDIATION QUALITY], available at 
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/FinalTaskForceMediation.pdf (reporting that 
experienced commercial mediation users consistently stressed the importance of lawyer and 
client preparation for mediation); HAROLD I. ABRAMSON, MEDIATION REPRESENTATION: 
ADVOCATING IN A PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS 159-60 (2004); ALFINI ET AL., supra note 22, 
at 430; COLE ET AL., supra note 45, at §§ 4:10-11; JULIE MACFARLANE, THE NEW LAWYER: 
HOW SETTLEMENT IS TRANSFORMING THE PRACTICE OF LAW 146 (2008); Tom Arnold, 20 
Common Errors in Mediation Advocacy, 13 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGA-
TION 69, 70  (1995); Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 1000, 1039; Donald T. Saposnek, Com-
mentary: The Future of the History of Family Mediation Research, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 
37, 40-41 (2004); Mark S. Umbreit et al., Victim-Offender Mediation: Three Decades of 
Practice and Research, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 279, 284-85 (2004); Welsh, supra note 15, 
at 657-58.  See generally Frank V. Ariano, A Lawyer’s Guide to Preparing Clients for 
Family Law Mediation, 90 ILL. B.J. 600 (2002); Shelby R. Grubbs, Preparing for Media-
tion: An Advocate’s Checklist, 32 TENN. B.J. 14 (Mar./Apr. 1996). 
 62. MCEWEN, supra note 49, at 61-62.  One of the study’s recommendations was that 
the EEOC develop “informational materials about the EEOC process and about mediation 
that would permit charging parties to make informed decisions about how to proceed with 
their charges and to have more realistic expectations when they do so.” Id. at 81. 
 63. Welsh, supra note 15, at 621-22.  These findings are based on pre-mediation inter-
views with parents in fourteen cases mediated during a two-month period in 2000.  Id. at 
607-11. None of the parents were represented in mediation by a lawyer; two were 
represented by a lay advocate. Id. 
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tions other than those they had already proposed; most seemed to hope that 
school officials would simply accept their demands upon gaining a better 
understanding of their child during mediation.64  In addition, what parties 
do to learn about and prepare for mediation has seldom been explored.  In 
domestic relations mediation, 38% of unrepresented parties read a court-
provided brochure about mediation, 24% spoke to someone from the court 
about mediation, and 20% gathered information about mediation on their 
own.65 
Having a lawyer is no guarantee that parties will receive information 
about and preparation for mediation.  Only 44% of parties in one domestic 
relations study met with their lawyer to talk about mediation before the first 
session.66  In another study, represented parties often had “profound mis-
conceptions” about the goals of divorce mediation.67 Almost half of 
represented parties interviewed in a study of general civil mediation felt ill-
prepared for mediation and uncertain about what to expect.68  Many parties 
said preparation by their lawyer consisted of a brief discussion just before 
the mediation session; others received no preparation at all.69  By contrast, 
most parties in the present study of general civil mediation received prepa-
ration for mediation from their lawyers: 57% received considerable prepa-
ration and 37% received some preparation.  Only 6% received little or no 
preparation. 
The amount of preparation parties received from their lawyers70 was un-
iformly and favorably related to parties’ and lawyers’ assessments of medi-
                                                          
 64. See id. at 627-28. 
 65. WISSLER, TRAPPING THE DATA, supra note 32 (based on new analyses of only unre-
presented parties in the Ohio dataset).  Parties were asked to check every action they took; 
some engaged in several of these actions.  Interestingly, represented parties were equally 
likely to engage in these actions. 
 66. Id.  Whether parties met with their lawyer prior to mediation was not related to their 
assessments of mediation or to settlement. Id. at 83, 92.  In these courts, lawyers generally 
did not attend mediation. Id. at 57. 
 67. Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: An Overview of Research 
Results, 19 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451, 466 (1985). 
 68. Julie Macfarlane & Michaela Keet, Civil Justice Reform and Mandatory Civil Medi-
ation in Saskatchewan: Lessons from a Maturing Program, 42 ALBERTA L. REV. 677, 692 
(2005). These findings are based on focus groups with thirty-one parties and interviews with 
eight institutional parties. Id. at 686. 
 69. MACFARLANE, supra note 61, at 204.  Lawyers themselves sometimes are not pre-
pared for mediation. See Craig A. McEwen et al., Lawyers, Mediation, and the Management 
of Divorce Practice, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 149, 159 (1994) (finding that 39% of divorce 
lawyers reported other lawyers were only “sometimes” or “rarely” well prepared for media-
tion). 
 70. Parties were asked to rate “Prior to the mediation, did your lawyer help you prepare 
for the mediation process?” on a five-point scale, from “not at all” to “a great deal.”  Law-
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ation71 in the present study of general civil mediation (see Table 1).72  Par-
ties who had more preparation for mediation, compared to parties with less 
preparation, thought that the mediation process was more fair; that they had 
more chance to tell their views and more input into the outcome; and that 
the mediator was more impartial, understood their views better, and treated 
them with more respect.73  Notably, parties who had more preparation felt 
less pressured to settle than did parties who had less preparation.  In addi-
tion, parties who received more preparation for mediation were more likely 
to settle and were more likely to think the settlement was fair.74 
                                                                                                                                      
yers were asked to rate “Did you prepare your client for the mediation session?” on the same 
scale. 
 71. Parties and lawyers rated the mediator and the mediation process on a number of 
dimensions, each on a five-point scale from “not at all” to “a great deal.” 
      72. To determine whether an observed relationship between two measures is a “true” 
relationship (or whether an observed difference between two or more groups is a “true” 
difference) or merely reflects chance variation, tests of statistical significance must be con-
ducted. The conventional level of probability for determining the statistical significance of 
findings is the .05 level (i.e., p <  .05).  The correlation coefficient (r) indicates the strength 
and direction of the relationship, and ranges from +1.00 to -1.00, with .00 indicating no 
relationship between the measures.  Cramer’s V provides a measure of the strength of the 
effect for chi-square (χ2) analyses. See RICHARD P. RUNYON & AUDREY HABER, FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF BEHAVIORAL STATISTICS 140-142, 230 (5th ed. 1984). 
 73. Perhaps these relationships were relatively small because of variation in the content 
of the preparation received.  For the components of mediation preparation that parties and 
lawyers think are helpful, see MEDIATION QUALITY, supra note 61, at 10-11; Macfarlane & 
Keet, supra note 68, at 693;  see also, e.g., ALFINI ET AL., supra note 22, at 430; JOHN W. 
COOLEY, MEDIATION ADVOCACY 49-50, 92-93 (2d ed. 2002); Arnold, supra note 61, at 70.  
In addition, parties in commercial mediation who felt their lawyers had better prepared them 
for mediation were more satisfied with their lawyers, and some reported making subsequent 
hiring decisions based on how much their lawyers had prepared for mediation. MEDIATION 
QUALITY, supra note 61, at 10-11. 
 74. Settlement, r = .115, p < .01. See also Julie Macfarlane, Culture Change? A Tale of 
Two Cities and Mandatory Court-Connected Mediation, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 241, 261 n.79 
(2002) (reporting that several empirical studies found lack of preparation to be an important 
reason for failing to settle in mediation). 
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Table 1. Relationships Between the Amount of Party Preparation and 
Parties’ and Lawyers’ Assessments of General Civil Mediation 
Parties’ Assessments 
Fair process .159*** Treated with respect .097*** 
Mediator was impartial .115*** Not pressured by mediator .067** 
Chance to tell views .164*** Not pressured by other 
side 
.064* 
Input into outcome .155*** Understood other’s views .074** 
Mediator understood 
views 
.150*** Understood own case .144*** 
Recommend mediation .105*** Satisfaction with process .105*** 
Fair settlement .087*   
Lawyers’ Assessments 
Fair process .134*** Mediator effective .105*** 
Mediator impartial .101*** Parties’ relationship .084*** 
Party involvement .155*** Timely issue definition .124*** 
Recommend mediation .181*** Evaluate other’s case .118*** 
Fair settlement .069+ Evaluate own case .144*** 
Notes: Positive Pearson correlation coefficients indicate that more preparation is associated 
with more favorable assessments. 
+ p < .10;  * p < .05;  ** p < .01;  *** p < .001
 
Lawyers who engaged in more client preparation for mediation also had 
consistently more favorable assessments of mediation than lawyers who did 
less client preparation in the present general civil mediation study (see Ta-
ble 1).  For instance, lawyers who did more client preparation thought that 
mediation was more fair, allowed more party involvement in resolving the 
case, and was more helpful in defining the issues and evaluating both their 
client’s and the other side’s case. 
Getting other forms of information or assistance before mediation, how-
ever, seemed to be associated with less favorable views of mediation and a 
lower rate of settlement.  Cases in domestic relations mediation were less 
likely to settle if one or both parties had gathered information about media-
tion on their own (46%) or had talked with someone from the court about 
mediation (41%) than if neither party had done so (61% and 68%, respec-
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tively).75  Parties who took these actions also tended to have less favorable 
assessments of mediation.76  Similarly, in EEO cases, charging parties who 
had sought assistance prior to mediation were less likely to settle in media-
tion than were parties who had not sought assistance.77  Getting pre-
mediation information or assistance might be expected to be helpful or to 
have no effect;78 it is not clear why it seems to have had negative effects.  
Perhaps these findings reflect the nature of the information the parties re-
ceived, but they may say more about the parties or the cases in which they 
are motivated to seek additional information.79 
In sum, parties often had inaccurate and unrealistic expectations about 
mediation.  Although unrepresented parties sometimes sought out informa-
tion about mediation, this was not necessarily helpful.  Represented parties 
were not always better informed about mediation, as their lawyers often did 
not prepare them for the process.  The more preparation lawyers gave their 
clients, however, the more favorable the parties’ assessments of mediation 
and the more likely the case was to settle. 
2. Does Representation Enhance the Fairness of the Mediation Process 
and Reduce Pressures to Settle? 
Process fairness, mediator impartiality, lack of coercion, and party self-
determination are among the most fundamental principles of mediation.80  
                                                          
 75. WISSLER, TRAPPING THE DATA, supra note 32, at 83. These findings include both 
represented and unrepresented parties. Reading a court-provided brochure about mediation 
was not related to settlement. Id. 
 76. Id. at 93.  Reading a court-provided brochure was not related to parties’ assessments.  
Id. 
 77. Thirty-one percent and over 52%, respectively.  MCEWEN, supra note 49, at 43, 
n.12. 
 78. Divorce education classes, offered in some jurisdictions prior to mediation though 
not designed specifically as preparation for mediation, have been found to help improve 
parties’ communication skills and to reduce conflict, which in turn could make their subse-
quent discussions in mediation more productive. Saposnek, supra note 61.  Prior to victim-
offender mediation, mediators or program staff typically meet separately with each party, 
leading most parties to feel adequately prepared for mediation and enhancing the success of 
mediation. Umbreit et al., supra note 61, at 285. 
 79. MCEWEN, supra note 49, at 43 n.12. 
 80. See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, §§ I.A, II, VI.A (Am. 
Arb. Ass’n et al. 2005) [hereinafter AAA MODEL STANDARDS], available at 
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/model_standards_conduct_april2007.pdf; ABA 
MODEL DIVORCE MEDIATION STANDARDS, supra note 60, §§ I, IV; MODEL RULE FOR THE 
LAWYER AS THIRD-PARTY NEUTRAL, R. 4.5.3, 4.5.6 & cmts. (CPR-Georgetown Comm’n on 
Ethics and Standards in ADR) [hereinafter MODEL RULE FOR NEUTRALS]; NAT’L STAN-
DARDS, supra note 17, §§ 8.1.f, 11.1 & cmts.; Nolan-Haley, supra note 17, at 787; Leonard 
Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 329, 
349, 354 (1984); Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-
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Procedural justice research has shown that these dimensions are interre-
lated: parties’ sense that they have control over the process and outcome 
and that they have received even-handed, considered, and respectful treat-
ment by the third party contributes to their views that the process is fair.81  
Some commentators argue that lawyers increase fairness in mediation by 
protecting their clients against mediator pressure as well as the opposing 
side’s unfair bargaining advantages.82  Others suggest that lawyers might 
not be needed because mediators can, and in some jurisdictions are re-
quired to, ensure the fairness of the process by addressing power imbal-
ances between the parties and by remaining impartial and not exerting pres-
sure on the parties; some, however, question whether mediators can fulfill 
these duties.83 
Several studies found that representation had no effect on parties’ as-
sessments of the fairness of the mediation process.  Two EEO mediation 
studies found no relationship between representation in mediation and par-
ties’ views of fairness.84  In the present domestic relations mediation study, 
                                                                                                                                      
Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization? 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
1, 15, 78-84 (2001). 
 81. See infra Part I.B.3 (discussing “voice” and participation). See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND 
& TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 104, 214 (1988); Tom 
R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 
65, 75-76 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2000); Nourit Zimerman & Tom R. 
Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice: A Psychological Perspective, 37 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473, 482-84 (2010); Wissler, supra note 10, at 346. 
 82. See, e.g., MACFARLANE, supra note 61, at 216-18; E. Patrick McDermott & Danny 
Ervin, The Influence of Procedural and Distributive Variables on Settlement Rates in Em-
ployment Discrimination Mediation, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 45, 59 (2005); McEwen et al., 
supra note 2, at 1327, 1348, 1360-61, 1376; Reuben, supra note 3, at 1098; Kenneth K. 
Stuart & Cynthia A. Savage, The Multi-Door Courthouse: How It’s Working, 26 COLO. 
LAW. 13, 15 (1997). 
 83. See, e.g., AAA MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 80, § VI; ABA MODEL DIVORCE 
MEDIATION STANDARDS, supra note 60, §§ XI, 25.4 (“[A] family mediator shall suspend or 
terminate the mediation process when the mediator reasonably believes that a participant is 
unable to effectively participate.”); MODEL RULE FOR NEUTRALS, supra note 80, R. 4.5.3, 
4.5.6 & cmts; McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1325-26, 1332-34; 1397-98, 1405-06. 
 84. MCEWEN, supra note 49, at 57, 59 (finding that neither charging parties’ nor res-
ponding parties’ views of fairness were related to whether neither, one, or both parties were 
represented; 92% of all parties thought the mediation process was fair).  Most of the 
represented parties were represented by lawyers. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.  
This study’s findings are based on information from charge records completed by mediators 
and questionnaires completed by 204 charging parties and 216 responding parties following 
the mediation of 267 claims in 1993-1994.  These claims were mediated as part of a volun-
tary pilot program in four EEOC field offices, in which mediation was arranged by EEOC 
staff and conducted by private mediators who did not report the mediation discussions to the 
EEOC. MCEWEN, supra note 49, at 4-6, 18, n.5.  If the parties did not reach complete 
agreement in mediation, the charging party was free to continue the EEOC process; if an 
agreement was reached, the EEOC would review it “to insure that it did not compromise the 
statutory rights of the charging party.” Id. at 6.  Arup Varma & Lamont E. Stallworth, Par-
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whether parties had a lawyer in mediation was not related to whether they 
felt the process was fair.85  Nor was the combined representational status of 
both parties (i.e., whether neither party, mother only, father only, or both 
were represented) related to parties’ views of fairness.86  Perhaps the effect 
of representation was muted in this study because mediators evened out 
bargaining imbalances: mediators were more likely to say they “tried to 
even out bargaining imbalances” when only one party had a lawyer present 
(100%) than when neither (93%) or both (86%) parties had lawyers 
present.87 
Some might argue that these studies found no effect of representation 
because unrepresented parties were unaware of what constitutes unfair pro-
cedures, and thus rated “objectively unfair” processes as fair.88 In the 
present domestic relations and general civil mediation studies, however, 
parties rated the mediation process as less fair than their lawyers did,89 
suggesting that parties did not have overly favorable assessments.  Regard-
less of their “objective accuracy,” parties’ assessments of process fairness 
are considered important measures of the quality of dispute resolution pro-
cedures and are related to parties’ compliance with agreements as well as 
their views of the legal system and its legitimacy.90 
                                                                                                                                      
ticipants’ Satisfaction with EEO Mediation and the Issue of Legal Representation: An Em-
pirical Study, 6 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 387, 403, tbl.3, 410 (2002)  (finding no differ-
ences in fairness ratings between unrepresented and lawyer-represented parties).  This 
study’s findings are based on questionnaires completed by twenty-five parties whose EEO 
disputes had gone through voluntary mediation conducted by a mediation service provider 
for the Kansas Human Rights Commission. Id. at 395-98.  This small sample size can make 
it difficult to find statistically significant differences. See RUNYON &  HABER, supra note 72, 
at 345-46.  However, the lack of differences on this particular measure is not due to the 
small sample; the mean ratings of the two groups are identical (3.55 on a five-point scale). 
 85. Fifty-seven percent of parties thought the mediation process was very fair and 35% 
thought it was somewhat fair; only 7% thought it was somewhat or very unfair. 
 86. Where possible, the effect of representation was examined both at the level of the 
individual party and at the case level (i.e., the combined representational status of both par-
ties) in the present domestic relations study.  Analyses at the individual level tell us only 
how parties’ views are affected by whether they have representation, without regard to 
whether the other party is represented.  Most studies have examined the effect of representa-
tion only at the individual party level. 
 87. χ2(2) = 14.81, p < .01, V =.10.  Given that virtually all parties thought the mediators 
were neutral, whatever the mediators did to try to even out bargaining imbalances apparent-
ly did not lead parties to view them as favoring one side or the other. 
 88. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, The Quality of Dispute Resolution Procedures and Out-
comes: Measurement Problems and Possibilities, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 419, 432-33 (1989). 
 89. Domestic relations: female parties, t(277) = 6.92, p < .001; male parties, t(248) = 
8.29, p < .001.  For civil mediation, see Wissler, supra note 32, at 663. 
 90. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 81, at 64-83, 208-11; Neil Vidmar, Procedural Jus-
tice and Alternative Dispute Resolution, in PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 121, 132 (Klaus F. Röhl & 
Stefan Machura eds., 1997); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Defining Quality in Dispute Resolu-
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In contrast to the preceding studies, two other studies found that legal 
representation was related to parties’ assessments of fairness, and that dif-
ferent representatives had different effects on fairness.  The first study, 
which involved the mediation of informal EEO complaints,91 found that 
charging parties were more likely to be “very satisfied with the fairness of 
the mediation process” when they were unrepresented than when they were 
represented by a lawyer, but that the opposite was true for responding par-
ties.92  Charging parties were less likely to be “very satisfied” with media-
tion’s fairness when they were represented by a lawyer than by other types 
of representatives, but the reverse was true for represented responding par-
ties. 93  Thus, lawyers had a different effect on the fairness assessments of 
charging parties than responding parties, and lawyers had a different effect 
than other types of representatives. 
These findings suggest that it was not representation per se, nor legal re-
presentation, that affected parties’ views of process fairness.  Rather, per-
haps something about the way in which the different types of representa-
tives conducted their representation led parties to see the mediation process 
as more or less fair.  Although the researchers did not examine whether 
differences existed in how the different types of representatives actually 
                                                                                                                                      
tion: Taxonomies and Anti-Taxonomies of Quality Arguments, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 335, 
348-51 (1989); Riskin, supra note 80, at 356-57; Tyler & Lind, supra note 81, at 71, 74. 
 91. See generally Bingham et al., supra note 51. This study’s findings are based on 
7,651 mediator case reports and exit surveys completed by 7,989 complainants and 6,794 
respondents following the voluntary mediation of EEO complaints within the USPS over 
several years.  Id. at 355-65.  This program differed from other EEO mediation programs in 
a number of ways that could have resulted in different effects of representation: the setting 
(operated by the employer), the mix of cases (“informal” EEO complaints), the type of med-
iation (transformative), the mandatory participation of responding parties, the speed with 
which cases entered mediation (within several weeks), the types of representatives (primari-
ly non-lawyers), the fact that the responding parties who attended mediation were the sub-
ject of the complaint, and the fact that lawyers for responding parties were provided at no 
cost. See id.; Lisa B. Bingham, Mediating Employment Disputes: Perceptions of Redress at 
the United States Postal Service, 17 REV. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 20, 23 (1997); Lisa B. 
Bingham & Mikaela Cristina Novac, Mediation’s Impact on Formal Discrimination Com-
plaint Filing: Before and After the Redress Program at the U.S. Postal Service, 21 REV. 
PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 308, 310 (2001); Nabatchi & Bingham, supra note 51, at 403.  In 
addition, the study’s very large sample size would make it easier to find statistically signifi-
cant differences. See RUNYON &  HABER, supra note 72, at 345-46. 
 92. Bingham et al., supra note 51, at 367.  Among charging parties, 67% of those who 
were unrepresented and 46% who were represented by a lawyer were “very satisfied” with 
the fairness of the mediation process. Id. at 368.  Among responding parties, 72% of those 
who were unrepresented and 81% represented by a lawyer were “very satisfied.” Id. at 370. 
 93. Among charging parties, 63% of those represented by the union and 62% 
represented by a co-worker were “very satisfied” with the fairness of the mediation process. 
Id. at 368.  Among responding parties, 68% of those represented by a co-worker and 64% of 
those with an association representative were “very satisfied.” Id. at 370.  See supra note 92 
for the ratings of parties who were represented by lawyers. 
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handled cases in mediation,94 they did note several characteristics on which 
the representatives differed that might have affected how they represented 
clients in mediation.  For instance, lawyers for charging parties had less 
experience with transformative mediation, less knowledge of the workplace 
setting and policies, and preferences that were less closely aligned with 
those of their clients than did lawyers for responding parties and other rep-
resentatives.95  As a result, lawyers for charging parties might have 
represented their clients in a different way during mediation, which in turn 
led their clients to see the process as less fair.96 
The second study, which involved special education mediation, found 
that unrepresented parents and parents with non-lawyer advocates thought 
the mediation process was less fair than did parents who had lawyers.97 
These findings might differ from those of other studies because of differ-
ences in the mediation context or the study methodology.98  For example, 
                                                          
 94. See, e.g., Macfarlane, supra note 74, at 253-60 (identifying five “ideal types” of 
mediation practice that reflected what lawyers sought to achieve in mediation, what ap-
proach they used during the session, and how they viewed their clients’ role in mediation); 
see also Karl Monsma & Richard Lempert, The Value of Counsel: 20 Years of Representa-
tion Before a Public Housing Eviction Board, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 627, 658-59 (1992) 
(finding that lawyers used several different styles when representing clients in public hous-
ing eviction hearings); Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Nancy Mills, What Family Lawyers Are 
Really Doing When They Negotiate, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 612, 612-16 (2006) (finding that 
lawyers’ negotiation behavior could be categorized into several different styles). 
 95. See Bingham et al., supra note 51, at 353-55, 366, 372-75. 
 96. Id. at 374; see also KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY, supra note 3, at 108, 170, 195 
(finding that familiarity and experience with the specific procedure and setting, plus know-
ledge of past practices and ongoing relationships, were important factors in representatives’ 
effectiveness in hearings in various settings); infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text 
(discussing how possible differences in style of representation might have affected parties’ 
satisfaction with their level of participation). 
 97. Kuriloff & Goldberg, supra note 53, at 55.  Parents were given the option to mediate 
when they requested a due process hearing; if they did not settle in mediation, they pro-
ceeded to a formal hearing. Id. at 45.  Questionnaires were completed by parents who had 
gone to mediation in 1987-1988. Id. at n.58.  The analyses examining the effect of represen-
tation on parents’ views included only cases that settled and were based on twenty-three to 
thirty-eight responses, depending on the measure. See id. at 55-56.  The researchers com-
bined unrepresented parents and parents represented by non-lawyer advocates into a single 
group for most analyses. See id. 
 98. For example, this study used a “process fairness” scale comprised of nineteen items, 
some of which might have tapped different aspects of parties’ views and, thus, produced 
different responses than the single measures used in other studies.  For example, some of the 
items in this scale were whether the parties gave up more than they wanted to, whether they 
felt pressured to settle, whether they could express their views, and whether the process was 
impartial.  Id. at 47.  The fact that this study examined the views of only parties who settled 
in mediation does not seem to explain why it found an effect of representation. In the 
present domestic relations mediation study, when the responses of only parties who settled 
were analyzed, there still was no effect of representation on parties’ views of process fair-
ness or mediator neutrality. 
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the impact of having a lawyer might have been greater in this study because 
the opposing party always was represented by a lawyer,99 which was less 
often the case in the other contexts.  Importantly, parties who thought their 
representative (lawyer or lay advocate) was more “effective” thought the 
mediation process was more fair.100  This latter finding lends additional 
support to the notion that characteristics of the representatives or how they 
conduct their representation affects parties’ assessments of mediation.101 
With regard to other party perceptions, namely settlement pressure and 
mediator neutrality, the present domestic relations mediation study general-
ly found that representation had no effect.  Whether parties did or did not 
have a lawyer in mediation was not related to whether they felt pressured to 
settle; nor was the combined representational status of both parties related 
to their feeling pressured to settle.  Overall, 6% of parties felt pressured to 
settle by the mediator, 13% felt pressured by the other side, and 6% felt 
pressured by their own lawyer.102  In addition, whether parties had a lawyer 
in mediation did not affect whether they thought the mediator was neu-
tral.103 When looking at the parties’ combined representational status, fe-
male parties’ views of mediator neutrality did not vary, but male parties 
were more likely to think the mediator favored them when they alone were 
represented.104 
Representation appeared to affect another aspect of domestic relations 
mediation that could have implications for parties’ perceptions of settle-
ment pressure and process fairness, even though it did not in the present 
study.  Mediators were less likely to say they used domestic violence pro-
tocols when neither party had a lawyer present in mediation (74%) than in 
                                                          
 99. Id. at 56. 
 100. Id. at 57-58.  This was true both for parents (r = .40) and for school officials (r = 
.33).  The “effectiveness of advocate” scale was comprised of eleven items, including 
whether parties thought their representative helped them get their story out, helped balance 
power, was knowledgeable about the relevant law, and was a source of support. Id. at 47. 
 101. See also E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations 
of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953, 969, 972 
(1990) (finding that, in a variety of dispute resolution processes other than mediation, par-
ties’ evaluations of their lawyers’ knowledge of the facts of the case and their trust that their 
lawyers would make decisions in their best interest were strongly related to procedural fair-
ness judgments). 
 102. See also MACFARLANE, supra note 61, at 219 (reporting that among cases in which 
parties sought to overturn mediated settlements on the basis of duress, many more were the 
result of pressure by their lawyer rather than pressure by the mediator); Howard Erlanger et 
al., Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes: Cautions From the Divorce Con-
text, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 585, 591, 593 (1987) (reporting that parties in bilateral negotia-
tions felt settlement pressure from their lawyers). 
 103. Ninety-seven percent of parties thought the mediator was neutral. 
 104. F(3,360) = 3.91, p < .01. 
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cases where one (81%) or both (88%) parties had lawyers in mediation.105  
Perhaps the mere presence of a lawyer prompted the mediators to use the 
domestic violence protocols, or perhaps the lawyers brought up the issue of 
abuse, leading the mediators to inquire further about it.  The parties’ repre-
sentational status did not affect whether the mediators conducted mediation 
in the usual way or used alternate procedures, such as separating the par-
ties, upon learning of abuse.  The presence of domestic violence was not 
related to parties’ views of mediation fairness, mediator impartiality, or 
settlement pressure.106  Nonetheless, these findings suggest that lack of re-
presentation may make it less likely that mediators will learn of abuse. 
In sum, there were no differences between represented and unrepre-
sented parties in whether they felt pressured to settle or thought the media-
tor was neutral.  Three studies found no differences between represented 
and unrepresented parties in their assessments of the fairness of the media-
tion process.  Two studies found differences, but there was no consistent 
pattern as to whether unrepresented parties thought the process was more or 
less fair than parties represented by a lawyer.  Nor were lawyers consistent-
ly associated with greater fairness than other types of representatives.  The 
way in which lawyers represented clients in mediation appeared to play a 
role in parties’ views of process fairness. 
3. Does Representation Enhance or Limit Party Participation and 
Expression of Views? 
Direct party participation is a key distinguishing feature of mediation 
and is thought to enhance parties’ understanding of the other side’s views 
and facilitate agreements that meet the parties’ interests.107 Some commen-
tators are concerned that lawyers’ presence in mediation will limit parties’ 
direct communication and will inhibit or transform their discussion of feel-
ings, issues, and solutions; others argue that lawyers’ presence is critical to 
                                                          
 105. χ2(2) = 9.69, p < .01, V = .133.  This difference was not because abused parties were 
more likely to be represented; there was no relationship between representation and parties’ 
reports of the existence of physical violence or its recency, frequency, or severity. 
 106. In the present study, parties in cases involving domestic violence could be exempted 
from mandatory mediation; thus, most cases involving serious violence probably were not 
referred to mediation. Twenty-nine percent of parties in mediation reported physical vi-
olence during their marriage; most of these said the violence was not recent, frequent, or 
severe.  If more cases with serious violence had been in mediation, the findings might have 
been different. 
 107. See, e.g., NAT’L STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 1.7 cmt.; ABRAMSON, supra note 61, 
at 187-88; JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RE-
SOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 10 (1984); Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31, at 
897-99; Sternlight, supra note 56, at 273-74, 332-33, 336; Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals 
in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do with It? 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 787, 
794-95 (2001). 
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ensuring that parties’ views are fully expressed and considered.108  There is 
a range of views about how active a role lawyers should play in mediation, 
from speaking as little as possible to speaking as much as they would in 
bilateral negotiation or trial.109  Others suggest that the appropriate role of 
lawyers in mediation depends on the nature of the case and the needs and 
preferences of the client.110 
Procedural justice research has clearly shown that process control or 
“voice”—having the opportunity to present one’s evidence and express 
one’s views—is critical to parties’ sense that the process is fair.111  But few 
procedural justice studies—and none in the mediation context, with its 
greater emphasis on and expectation of direct party participation—have 
examined whether parties’ perception of voice is different when parties 
express their views directly versus indirectly through a representative.112  
The only study to examine parties’ post-experience assessments113 found 
that unrepresented parties felt they had a somewhat greater opportunity to 
express their views than did represented parties.114 
                                                          
 108. See, e.g., Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 1000; Lande, supra note 11, at 892, 894; 
McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1327, 1354-55, 1364, 1371-74; Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, 
Lawyers, Clients, and Mediation, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1369, 1380-81 (1998); Tamara 
Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’ Litigation 
Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701, 726-27 (2007); Sternlight, supra note 56, at 274, 345-48, 
356; Stuart & Savage, supra note 82, at 15; Welsh, supra note 107, at 787, 802-03. See gen-
erally Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31. 
 109. See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 61, at 1, 191, 253; Arnold, supra note 61, at 69; 
Reuben, supra note 3, at 1096; Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31, at 919-21; Sternlight, supra 
note 56, at 270, 274-89, 345-49, 356-57. 
 110. See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 61, at 186, 192; COOLEY, supra note 73, at 95; 
Sternlight, supra note 56, at 348-49, 355-67. 
 111. LIND & TYLER supra note 81, at 101-06, 215; Tyler & Lind, supra note 81, at 70; 
Wissler, supra note 10, at 345-46. 
 112. Tyler & Zimerman, supra note 81, at 493-94; Welsh, supra note 107, at 841. 
 113. Two studies examined pre-experience views by asking students to indicate what 
procedure they thought they would prefer to use to resolve a hypothetical dispute.  One 
study found respondents preferred a procedure in which they could present the evidence 
themselves; the other study found no appreciable differences but a slight preference for 
procedures in which a representative would present the evidence. See Stephen LaTour et al., 
Procedure: Transnational Perspectives and Preferences, 86 YALE L.J. 258, 278 (1976); 
Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Closer, 
Modern Look at an Old Idea, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 211, 243-44 (2004).  These 
findings, however, might not shed light on parties’ post-experience views of representation, 
as research has found that the cognitive processes used in making post-experience evalua-
tions differ from those used in making pre-experience predictions. See id. at 213-14; Lind & 
Tyler, supra note 81 at 15. 
 114. See Tyler & Zimerman, supra note 81, 491. 
WISSLER_CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:55 PM 
2010] REPRESENTATION IN MEDIATION 443 
a. Opportunities for Parties’ Discussion and Improved Understanding 
McEwen and colleagues concluded that the presence of lawyers did not 
alter the nature of discussions in divorce mediation: parties still candidly 
expressed their emotions, had the opportunity to present their interests and 
listen to the other side, and engaged in a problem-solving exploration of 
integrative solutions.115  The present study of domestic relations mediation, 
which included some of the same courts, also found that whether mediators 
encouraged the parties to say how they felt, summarized what the parties 
said, or suggested possible options for settlement did not vary with the 
presence of lawyers.116  In other mediation contexts, however, the effect of 
lawyers on the nature of discussions might be different.117 
Lawyers’ presence in domestic relations mediation had mixed effects on 
whether parties felt that their understanding of their own needs, as well as 
the needs and views of others, had improved during mediation.  There was 
no relationship between lawyers’ presence and whether parties felt their 
understanding of their children’s needs had improved.118  Representation 
had a small and mixed effect on parties’ understanding of their own needs 
and concerns: parties who did not have a lawyer in mediation were more 
likely than represented parties to say that mediation helped them see their 
needs more clearly (48% vs. 45%), but they were also more likely to say 
                                                          
 115. McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1368, 1392-93.  These findings are based on inter-
views with eighty-eight divorce lawyers in Maine from 1990 to 1991, plus observations of 
mediation sessions. Id. at 1358, 1373. 
 116. There was no effect of individual or combined representational status.  Overall, me-
diators said they encouraged parties to say how they felt in 92% of cases, frequently summa-
rized parties’ statements in 92% of cases, and suggested settlement options in 83% of cases.  
A similar percentage of parties said the mediators had engaged in each of these actions.  Of 
course, this does not mean that the parties did express their feelings. 
 117. In general civil mediation, parties’ discussion of emotions, non-monetary concerns, 
and settlement options often appears to be restricted.  See, e.g., Relis, supra note 108, at 
724-26, 733-34, 742-43; Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31, at 864-66, 871-76, 894-97.  Be-
cause parties are almost always represented in these cases, it is not clear whether this nar-
rowed discussion is due to the presence of lawyers, or whether it would occur even if law-
yers were absent, reflecting the mediators’ presumptions about what issues and options are 
relevant in these cases.  See, e.g., Dwight Golann, Variations in Mediation: How – and Why 
– Legal Mediators Change Styles in the Course of a Case, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 41, 61; 
Lande, supra note 11, at 880, 885; Relis, supra note 108, at 739; Riskin & Welsh, supra 
note 31, at 896-97.  Mediators in general civil cases usually are lawyers, while mediators in 
domestic relations mediation often are non-lawyers.  See, e.g., WISSLER, TRAPPING THE DA-
TA, supra note 32, at 65; Kelly, supra note 43, at 11, 16; Wissler, supra note 11, at 64; supra 
notes 34, 38. 
 118. There was no effect of individual or combined representational status.  Overall, 41% 
of parties said mediation helped them see their children’s needs more clearly, 57% said no 
change, and 2% said less clearly. 
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that they saw their needs less clearly (4% vs. 1%).119  Finally, parties were 
somewhat more likely to say that mediation helped them better understand 
the other person’s views when they did not have a lawyer in mediation than 
when they did (69% vs. 59%).120 
In sum, representation did not seem to affect the discussion of feelings 
and settlement options, at least not in domestic relations mediation.  Repre-
sentation was related to slightly less improvement in parties’ understanding 
of the other side’s views, and had a mixed effect on parties’ understanding 
of their own concerns. 
b. Parties’ Participation in Mediation and Chance to Tell Their Views 
Whether representation was related to parties’ sense that they had a 
chance to tell their views varied across studies.  In the present study of do-
mestic relations mediation, parties’ representational status was not related 
to whether parties felt they had “enough chance” to tell their “views of the 
dispute.”121  By contrast, unrepresented parties in a study of EEO media-
tion appeared to be more satisfied with the opportunity to present their side 
of the dispute than represented parties.122 
How much or how actively parties participated in mediation, or how sa-
tisfied they were with their level of participation, was greater in most stu-
dies when parties were unrepresented than when they were represented by a 
lawyer.  In the present study of domestic relations mediation, parties’ par-
ticipation, as rated by the mediators, was more likely to be “very active” 
when neither side was represented (male party, 86%; female party, 78%) 
than when both sides were represented (male party, 59%; female party, 
62%).123  When a lawyer for only one party was present, the impact on par-
ty participation depended on whether it was the party’s own lawyer or the 
opposing party’s lawyer: parties’ participation was more likely to be “very 
active” when only opposing counsel was present (male party, 90%; female 
                                                          
 119. χ2(2) = 8.09, p < .05, V = .10.  Unrepresented parties were less likely than 
represented parties to say that mediation had no effect on their ability to see their own needs 
(48% vs. 54%).  There was no effect of the parties’ combined representational status. 
 120. χ2(2) = 5.12, p = .077, V = .079.  There was no significant effect of combined repre-
sentational status. 
 121. There was no effect of individual or combined representational status.  Overall, 87% 
of parties felt they “had enough chance” to tell their views.   
 122. The mean ratings were 4.09 and 3.64 for unrepresented and represented parties, 
respectively, on a five-point scale.  Varma & Stallworth, supra note 84, at 403 tbl.3.  The 
authors did not report a statistical significance test for this individual question, so this may 
or may not be a true difference. 
 123. Male party (F(3, 636) = 14.40, p < .001); female party (F(3, 626) = 2.66, p < .05).  
Overall, mediators said 66% of parties participated “very actively,” 30% “somewhat active-
ly,” and only 4% “not at all actively.” 
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party, 80%) than when only their own lawyer was present (male party, 
61%; female party, 69%).  Thus, parties were about equally likely to partic-
ipate “very actively” when no lawyers were present as when only opposing 
counsel was present, and parties were about equally likely to participate 
“very actively” when both parties were represented as when a party’s own 
lawyer was present.  Taken together, these findings suggest that a reduction 
in active party participation in the present domestic relations mediation 
study was associated with being represented rather than with whether the 
opposing party was represented.124 
Lawyers’ presence was related to parties’ “satisfaction with their level of 
participation” in EEO mediation.  In one study, unrepresented parties ap-
peared to be more satisfied with their level of participation than represented 
parties.125  The second study, which involved the mediation of informal 
EEO complaints, found that charging parties were more likely to be “very 
satisfied” with their “level of participation in mediation” when they were 
unrepresented than when they were represented by a lawyer, but that there 
was little difference in responding parties’ satisfaction.126 Charging parties 
were less likely to be “very satisfied” with their level of participation when 
they were represented by a lawyer than by other types of representatives, 
but the reverse was true for responding parties..127    Thus, lawyers had a 
different effect on parties’ satisfaction with their level of participation for 
charging parties than for responding parties, and they had a different effect 
than other types of representatives.  These findings suggest that it was not 
                                                          
 124. These findings appear to contrast with those of an earlier study in some of the same 
courts, in which the lawyers reported they generally let their clients take the lead role in 
mediation and intervened only when needed. See McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1371-73, 
1392-93.  Although the lawyers might have exaggerated the amount of party participation, 
the program director and the researchers’ observations of mediation sessions confirmed that 
the lawyers encouraged their clients to speak during mediation. Id. at 1373.  Both studies are 
in agreement that parties participated actively in a majority of cases, even when lawyers 
were present. 
 125. The mean ratings for unrepresented and represented parties, respectively, were 4.18 
and 3.76 on a five-point scale.  Varma & Stallworth, supra note 84, at 403 tbl.3.  The au-
thors did not report a statistical significance test for this individual question, so this may or 
may not be a true difference. 
 126. Among charging parties, 76% of those who were unrepresented and 55% who were 
represented by a lawyer were “very satisfied” with their level of participation. Bingham et 
al., supra note 51, at 371 tbl.11.  Among responding parties, 73% of those who were unre-
presented and 75% represented by a lawyer were “very satisfied.” Id. at 372 tbl.12. 
 127. Among charging parties, 72% of those represented by the union and 70% 
represented by a co-worker were “very satisfied” with their level of participation. Id. at 371 
tbl.11.  Among responding parties, 70% of those represented by a co-worker but only 54% 
of those with an association representative were “very satisfied.” Id. at 372 tbl.12. See supra 
note 126 for the ratings of parties who were represented by lawyers. 
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simply having a representative, nor having a legal representative, that was 
related to parties’ satisfaction with their level of participation in mediation. 
There are several possible reasons why parties’ amount of participation 
or satisfaction with their level of participation might be lower when they 
are represented and might vary across representatives.  First, how much 
parties talk during mediation almost inevitably will be reduced when they 
are represented, unless their representatives remain totally silent.128  And 
how much the representatives participate, or conversely, encourage their 
clients to participate, is likely to reflect the representatives’ approach to 
mediation and their views of the relative benefits and risks of direct party 
participation, which are likely to vary with the type of case, the local legal 
and mediation cultures, and the representatives’ experience with media-
tion.129  In the EEO mediation study by Bingham and colleagues, for in-
stance, charging parties’ lawyers tended to be less familiar with transforma-
tive mediation than union representatives and responding parties’ lawyers, 
which might have led them to participate more actively than the other rep-
resentatives.130  This likely would have violated parties’ expectations about 
their own level of participation and reduced their satisfaction with their 
level of participation.131 
Second, parties might feel they have less chance to tell their views or 
might be less satisfied with their level of participation when others are 
speaking for them because they have less control over what is said than 
when they are presenting their own views and concerns.  This might be es-
                                                          
 128. See Bingham et al., supra note 51, at 373-74; Lande, supra note 11, at 892; McEwen 
et al., supra note 2, at 1372.  Another possible explanation for the apparent reduction in 
participation associated with representation is that parties’ representational status might be 
confounded with their willingness to speak in mediation.  That is, parties might be more 
likely to hire a lawyer if they do not feel comfortable speaking in mediation, and their dis-
comfort would also reduce their participation.  But this does not seem to explain the findings 
regarding parties’ satisfaction with their level of participation; presumably, parties who 
hired a representative to speak for them would have been satisfied if the representative did 
so.  This suggests that “level of participation” might reflect parties’ sense of “participation” 
in the mediation process in a broader sense than simply how much they spoke during the 
session. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text; Part I.B.3.c. 
 129. See Macfarlane, supra note 74, at 270-76; McEwen et al., supra note 69, at 167-68. 
 130. See Bingham et al., supra note 51, at 370, 374.  Transformative mediation differs 
from the forms of mediation commonly used in general civil cases in its emphasis on par-
ties’ opportunity for voice and on the goals of party empowerment and mutual recognition 
and understanding, with settlement viewed as a possible byproduct rather than a primary 
objective.  See Bingham & Novac, supra note 91, at 311. 
 131. See Bingham et al., supra note 51, at 373 (noting that the information the parties had 
received about the mediation program stressed the opportunity for direct party participa-
tion).  However, this does not appear to explain why responding parties were much less 
likely to be “very satisfied” with their level of participation when they had an association 
representative, who presumably would have been familiar with the mediation program. 
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pecially likely when parties disagree with their representatives about what 
should be said and how, or about the relative importance of different is-
sues.132  How well parties believe their representative understands their 
interests and objectives, and how accurately their representative communi-
cates their views and concerns when speaking for them, may play a large 
role in parties’ sense of voice and satisfaction with their level of participa-
tion in mediation, and is likely to vary across mediation contexts and repre-
sentatives.133  For instance, in the EEO mediation study by Bingham and 
colleagues, the pattern of findings regarding parties’ satisfaction with their 
participation might reflect that union representatives and responding par-
ties’ lawyers were more likely than charging parties’ lawyers to understand 
the workplace setting and to share their clients’ priorities and prefe-
rences.134 
In summary, there was no consistent pattern across studies as to whether 
representation was related to parties’ sense that they had a chance to tell 
their views of the dispute.  The amount of parties’ participation as well as 
their satisfaction with their level of participation generally were higher 
when they were unrepresented than when represented by a lawyer in med-
iation.  Legal representation had different effects for different types of par-
ties and had different effects than did non-legal representation, suggesting 
that the effects of “representation” on parties’ satisfaction with their level 
of participation might be related to how that representation is carried out. 
c. Relationships Among Voice, Participation and Assessments 
As noted above, in the present domestic relations mediation study, par-
ties were less likely to actively participate when they were represented than 
when they were unrepresented, but they were not less likely to feel they 
                                                          
 132. See Bingham et al., supra note 51, at 353, 372-73; Relis, supra note 108, at 702, 
725-27, 742-43 (finding that medical malpractice lawyers seldom understood their client’s 
objectives and concerns, and these misconceptions affected how they handled cases in med-
iation); Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31, at 877-82 (illustrating differences between lawyers 
and clients in their understanding of the problem, and how those problem definitions af-
fected the lawyers’ approach to mediation and their client’s participation in sessions); Var-
ma & Stallworth, supra note 84, at 413-14; see also ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND 
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 75-76 (2000) (listing 
differences in preferences, incentives, and interests among the aspects of principal-agent 
conflict); Nolan-Haley, supra note 108, at 1381; Welsh, supra note 107, at 840, 857. 
 133. See, e.g., Lind et al., supra note 101, at 972; LIND & TYLER, supra note 81, at 30; 
Welsh, supra note 107, at 842-43. 
 134. Bingham et al., supra note 51, at 353, 366, 372-75.  However, this does not appear 
to explain why responding parties were less satisfied with their level of participation when 
they had an association representative, who presumably would have understood the issues 
and shared the parties’ preferences. 
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had enough chance to tell their views.135  These findings seem to suggest 
that parties can feel they have voice indirectly through their lawyers, even 
when their actual participation is reduced.  An additional finding seems to 
support this conclusion: 88% of the parties who mediators said were “not at 
all active” in mediation nonetheless felt they had “enough chance” to tell 
their views of the dispute.  But drawing this conclusion from these data 
might not be warranted because the mediators rated the parties’ participa-
tion; that is, there might have been less of an apparent disconnect between 
participation and voice if the parties had rated their own level of participa-
tion as well as their sense of voice. 
The present study of general civil mediation did not have this problem 
because the parties reported both how much chance they had to tell their 
views of the dispute and how much time they (and their lawyer) spoke for 
their side.136  A majority of parties (77%) felt they had a considerable 
chance to tell their views.137  By contrast, only a minority of parties said 
they spent a considerable amount of time speaking for their side (25%).138  
A majority of parties said their lawyer spent a considerable amount of time 
speaking for their side (64%)139 and talked more than they did (57%).140  
Thus, many more parties felt a sense of voice than might be expected given 
the amount of time they actually talked during mediation. 
Additional analyses of the present study of general civil mediation 
showed that, among parties who said they did not speak “at all” for their 
                                                          
 135. See supra notes 121, 123 and accompanying text. 
 136. Parties were asked to rate both “How much chance did you have to tell your views 
of the dispute?” and “In speaking for your side, how much of the time did you do the talk-
ing?,” each on a five-point scale from “not at all” to “a great deal.”  Parties and lawyers, 
respectively, also were asked to rate, “In speaking for your side, how much of the time did 
your lawyer/your client do the talking?,” on the same scale.  There was a great deal of 
agreement in the parties’ and lawyers’ ratings. 
 137. Sixteen percent felt they had some opportunity to tell their views of the dispute and 
8% felt they had little or no chance to tell their views. 
 138. Forty-five percent said they spent some time talking in speaking for their side and 
30% said they spent little or no time talking. 
 139. Thirty-two percent said their lawyer spent some time talking; only 5% said their 
lawyer did little or no talking. 
 140. Only 11% of parties talked more than their lawyer, and 32% talked the same amount 
as their lawyer.  These analyses considered talking “the same amount” to be when the party 
gave the identical ratings for how much they talked and how much their lawyer talked.  
Another study of general civil mediation found a similar distribution of party-lawyer partic-
ipation.  See CRAIG A. MCEWEN, AN EVALUATION OF THE ADR  PILOT PROJECT: FINAL RE-
PORT 20 (1992) (copy on file with author).  One other study found little party participation, 
but another found that most parties participated actively.  See KEITH SCHILDT ET AL., MAJOR 
CIVIL CASE MEDIATION PILOT PROGRAM: 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ILLINOIS, PRELIMINARY 
REPORT (1994), available at http://caadrs.org/downloads/niustudy.pdf; Stevens H. Clarke & 
Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Public Sponsorship of Private Settling: Court-Ordered Civil Case 
Mediation, 19 JUST. SYS. J. 311, 319 (1997). 
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side during mediation, 50% nonetheless felt they had a considerable chance 
to tell their views of the dispute.141  Among parties who said their lawyer 
spoke “a great deal” for their side during mediation, 77% felt they had a 
considerable chance to tell their views of the dispute.142  Not surprisingly, 
among parties who said they spent a “great deal” of time speaking for their 
side, 91% said they had a considerable chance to tell their views.  Thus, 
although talking a lot virtually guaranteed that parties felt they had voice, 
not talking at all, or having a lawyer who talked a great deal, did not pre-
vent a substantial number of parties from feeling they had a chance to tell 
their views.  These findings suggest that parties can feel they have voice 
through their lawyers.  It is not clear, however, why some parties who did 
not talk in mediation felt they had voice while others did not; perhaps it 
made a difference whether parties preferred not to talk and wanted their 
lawyer to speak for them, or whether they were “shut down” by their law-
yers, the mediator, or the other side.143 
Because representation generally was associated with less party partici-
pation but not necessarily with parties’ feeling that they had less chance to 
tell their views, additional analyses were conducted to examine how party 
participation and sense of voice are related to parties’ assessments of medi-
ation.  In the present domestic relations mediation study, parties who said 
they had “enough chance” to tell their views were more likely to feel the 
process and outcome were fair and to feel less pressured to settle than were 
parties who said they did not have enough chance to tell their views.144  By 
contrast, how actively parties participated in domestic relations mediation 
was not related to their assessments of the fairness of the process or out-
come,145 and parties who participated more actively tended to feel more 
                                                          
 141. Nineteen percent felt they had some chance to tell their views and 31% felt they had 
little or no chance. 
 142. Fourteen percent felt they had some chance to tell their views and 8% felt they had 
little or no chance. 
 143. See Macfarlane & Keet, supra note 68, at 692 (finding that parties in general civil 
mediation were disappointed and frustrated when their lawyers took over the session or 
instructed them “to keep quiet and leave the talking to counsel”).  Parties said they wanted 
“to be ‘supported’ but not ‘shut down’ by their lawyers” during mediation. Id. at 693; see 
also LaTour et al., supra note 113 at 273-74 (noting that lawyers’ presentation of the case 
could enhance parties’ voice if parties feel their lawyer can present their case better than 
they can); McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1363 (noting that some clients want their lawyer 
to speak for them); Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31, at 875-76, 894-95, 907-98 (describing 
problems that arise when lawyers shut their clients out of mediation sessions entirely). 
 144. Process fair, r(821) = .364, p < .001; settlement fair, r(668) = .193, p < .001; pres-
sure to settle, r(833) = -.242, p < .001. 
 145. See also Susan J. Rogers & Claire Francy, Communication in Mediation: Is More 
Necessarily Better?  MEDIATION Q. 39, 45-47 (Winter 1988) (finding that how much unre-
presented parties talked in community mediation was not related to their satisfaction with 
mediation or to whether settlement was achieved or the agreement endured).  The research-
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pressured to settle than those who participated less actively.146  These con-
trasting findings seem to suggest that parties’ sense of voice is more impor-
tant to their experience in mediation than is how much they participate.147 
In the present general civil mediation study, parties’ having more chance 
to tell their views and speaking more for their side were both related to see-
ing mediation as more fair as well as having more favorable assessments of 
mediation on most dimensions (see the first and second columns of coeffi-
cients in Table 2).148  But parties’ sense of voice was much more strongly 
related to their assessments than was their amount of participation, which is 
similar to the pattern seen above in the present domestic relations study.  
Settlement pressure was an exception: feeling one had more chance to tell 
one’s views was associated with feeling less pressured to settle, but talking 
more was associated with feeling more pressured to settle.  Whether parties 
talked more than their lawyer in speaking for their side showed a pattern of 
even smaller and less consistent relationships with parties’ assessments of 
mediation than did the absolute amount parties talked (see the third column 
of coefficients in Table 2).  Notably, talking more than one’s lawyer was 
not related to parties’ views of fairness of the process or outcome, and par-
ties who talked more than their lawyer felt more pressured to settle than 
parties who talked less than their lawyer. 
                                                                                                                                      
ers suggested that the nature of the interaction and discussions might be more important to 
parties’ views of mediation and the mediation outcome than the amount of discussion.  Id. at 
48. 
 146. Female parties, r(385) = .115, p < .05; male parties, r(363) = .087, p = .097. 
 147. Two caveats: First, the direction of these relationships cannot be discerned from 
correlations.  That is, one cannot tell whether parties’ having more chance to tell their views 
led to more favorable assessments of mediation, or whether a more fair process involving 
less settlement pressure gave parties more chance to tell their views.  Second, the relative 
strength of the relationships for participation and voice might be an artifact of the fact that 
the mediators rated the parties’ participation; the correlations involving participation might 
have been stronger if the parties had rated their own level of participation. 
 148. Parties rated both their sense of voice and how much they participated.  See supra 
note 136 and accompanying text; see also Lind et al., supra note 101, at 969, 972 (finding 
that, in a variety of dispute resolution processes other than mediation, tort litigants’ sense of 
control over the way their case was handled was strongly related to procedural fairness 
judgments, while how much they felt they “participated in the process of disposing” of their 
case was not). 
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Table 2. Relationships Between Measures of Party and Lawyer Participa-















 Had chance to tell views — .307*** .230*** n.s. 
 Fair process .422*** .089*** n.s. .067* 
 Mediator was impartial .324*** .047+  n.s. n.s. 
 Mediator understood views .391*** .136*** .046+  .076** 
 Treated with respect .261*** n.s. -.035+  .097** 
 Not pressured by mediator .043* -.061* -.110*** .104*** 
 Not pressured by other side .076*** -.053* -.106*** .112*** 
 Had input into outcome .345*** .210*** .109*** .062* 
 Understood other’s views .193*** .085*** n.s. .072*** 
 Understood own case .152*** .097** n.s. .122*** 
 Satisfaction with process .255*** .054** n.s. .050* 
 Recommend mediation  .270*** .072** n.s. .088*** 
 Fair settlement .185*** .059+  n.s. .068+  
 Notes: The measures of participation were based on parties’ ratings.  Positive Pearson cor-
relation coefficients indicate that more participation is associated with more favorable as-
sessments; negative coefficients indicate that more participation is associated with less fa-
vorable assessments. 
+  p < .10;  * p < .05;  ** p < .01;  *** p < .001 n.s.= not statistically significant
 
Parties’ assessments of mediation generally were more favorable when 
their lawyers spoke more for their side than when their lawyers spoke less 
(see the fourth column of coefficients in Table 2).  Although the relation-
ships were small, how much one’s lawyer talked was significantly related 
to more assessments of mediation than was whether parties talked more 
than their lawyer.  Notably, parties who said their lawyer talked more felt 
less pressured to settle than did parties who said their lawyer talked less, 
which is opposite the direction of the relationship between pressure and 
how much the parties talked.149  And how much their lawyer talked was not 
                                                          
 149. Perhaps mediators direct their reality testing at parties when they participate more 
actively, but at lawyers when they participate more.  And perhaps lawyers’ potential to act 
as a buffer from the other side is related to how much they participate, both in absolute 
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related to whether parties felt they had enough chance to tell their views, 
suggesting that it is something other than how much their lawyer talks that 
contributes to parties’ sense of voice. 
In summary, although direct party participation in mediation was related 
to parties’ sense of  voice, a substantial number of parties who did not par-
ticipate directly nonetheless felt they had a considerable chance to tell their 
views.  Thus, parties can feel they have voice through their lawyers, though 
not all do.  Parties’ sense that they had a chance to tell their views was 
more strongly related to favorable assessments of mediation than was how 
much they participated. Thus, ensuring that parties feel they have a chance 
to fully express their views appears to be more important to their expe-
rience in mediation than how much they participate directly. 
4. Does Representation Make the Mediation Process More or Less 
Contentious? 
Many assume the presence of lawyers makes the mediation process more 
adversarial, polarized, and contentious, thereby exacerbating conflict and 
reducing the opportunity for constructive problem solving and improved 
party relationships.150  Some commentators maintain instead that lawyers 
dampen the level of conflict in mediation because they are not emotionally 
involved in the dispute, are trained to evaluate issues rationally, are likely 
to have a more realistic assessment of the probable outcome than their 
clients, and often need to maintain a reputation for cooperation with oppos-
ing counsel.151  Others note that whether lawyers increase or decrease con-
                                                                                                                                      
terms and relative to their clients.  See, e.g., LaTour et al., supra note 113, at 273-74 (sug-
gesting that representatives might serve as a buffer by reducing direct interaction between 
the parties). 
 150. See, e.g., ALFINI ET AL., supra note 22; Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, 
Cooperation and Competition in Litigation: Can Lawyers Dampen Conflict?, in BARRIERS 
TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 184, 185 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995); MACFARLANE, 
supra note 61, at 148; McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1364, 1373; John Lande, Practical 
Insights From an Empirical Study of Cooperative Lawyers in Wisconsin, 2008 J. DISP. RE-
SOL. 203, 249-50 (reporting lawyers’ perceptions of lawyers’ and parties’ mindsets in litiga-
tion-oriented, cooperative, and collaborative practices); Nolan-Haley, supra note 108, at 
1380; Reuben, supra note 3, at 1097 (quoting the Supreme Court decision in Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, that counsel “would inevitably give the proceedings a more adversary cast”); 
Riskin, supra note 80, at 330. 
 151. HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISK, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LE-
GAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES  119-28 (2004) [hereinafter KRITZER, RISK, REPUTA-
TIONS, AND REWARDS]; DEAN G. PRUITT & PETER J. CARNEVALE, NEGOTIATION IN SOCIAL 
CONFLICT 154-56 (1993); Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 150, at 209.  Although lawyers’ 
analytic tendencies might reduce contentiousness during mediation, they also can lead law-
yers to overlook or reframe the emotional issues and objectives that often are important to 
parties.  See Relis, supra note 108, at 702, 725-27, 733-34; Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31, 
at 889. 
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tentiousness in mediation might depend on how they react to their clients’ 
positions and expectations and how they choose to advocate for their 
clients in mediation.152  Some suggest that the dynamics of the mediation 
process itself and its face-to-face nature demand civility and make postur-
ing more difficult, limiting adversarial behavior.153  If parties in cases in-
volving more intense conflicts are more likely to hire lawyers, the presence 
of lawyers might be associated with greater contentiousness in mediation, 
not because of anything the lawyers do, but because of the more acrimo-
nious nature of the underlying dispute.154   
McEwen and colleagues concluded that most lawyers were not aggres-
sively adversarial in divorce mediation.155  In the present domestic relations 
mediation study, which included some of the same courts, only indirect 
measures were available to examine the effect of lawyers on the tone of 
mediation.  First, parties’ assessments of whether their dealings with each 
other regarding their children would improve as a result of mediation were 
examined: presumably, the more contentious the mediation, the less likely 
parties would predict their dealings would improve.  Parties who did not 
have a lawyer in mediation were more likely than parties who had a lawyer 
to say that their dealings with each other regarding the children would im-
prove (41% vs. 35%), but they were also more likely to say that their deal-
ings would worsen (16% vs. 10%) as a result of mediation.156  Second, the 
effect of representation on whether opposing parties in the same case had 
similar or divergent perceptions of mediation was examined: presumably, 
the more adversarial and polarized the mediation session, the more parties’ 
views would diverge.157  Neither the parties’ individual nor their combined 
                                                          
 152. MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 132, at 156, 166-70; Beck & Sales, supra note 2, at 
1028; Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 986 (1979); Sternlight, supra note 56, at 291-97.  Law-
yers who have more experience with mediation are more likely to consider not only the 
interests and perspectives of their client but also of the other side.  See Macfarlane, supra 
note 74, at 297, 300; McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1367. 
 153. McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1368-69. 
 154. See, e.g., ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SO-
CIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 108-12 (1992) (noting that parties who were more 
willing to fight and whose preferences were more in conflict with the other side’s would be 
more likely to seek legal counsel). 
 155. McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1368-69. 
 156. χ2(2) = 6.25, p < .05, V = .097.  Unrepresented parties were less likely to say there 
would be no change in their dealings with the other parent than were parties with a lawyer 
(43% vs. 54%).  Parties’ ratings were not related to their combined representational status. 
 157. In small claims cases, opposing parties had more divergent perceptions of the fair-
ness of the process and the outcome following trial than mediation; trial was seen as more 
adversarial than mediation on several dimensions. See Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. 
Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237, 
258-59 (1981); Wissler, supra note 10, at 335-36, 344.  This may be because adversarial 
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representational status was related to how similar or divergent their as-
sessments of the mediator, the process, or the outcome were on most di-
mensions.  The one exception was that parties’ views of the mediator’s 
neutrality diverged less when the parties had a lawyer than when they did 
not.158 
These limited findings suggest that the presence of lawyers neither sub-
stantially increased nor decreased the adversarialness or contentiousness of 
mediation.  This conclusion, however, might be confined to the domestic 
relations context, in which most lawyers engage in cooperative problem 
solving rather than adversarial posturing.159  The professional norm of the 
“reasonable lawyer” who tries to reduce conflict and facilitate settlement160 
likely developed due to several aspects of family law practice: the substan-
tive legal rules, policies, and economic incentives; the more active and di-
rect involvement of clients in the negotiation process; and the local and 
specialized nature of the family law bar.161 Additional evidence suggests 
that divorce practice became less adversarial after mediation use became 
common.162 
To the extent that these same factors operate in other practice areas, or 
that the structure of the mediation process itself or greater experience with 
mediation reduces lawyers’ adversarial tendencies within the mediation 
session, these findings might not be unique to domestic relations media-
                                                                                                                                      
processes tend to focus more on who is right and who is wrong, so that parties are more 
likely to feel there is a winner and a loser.  The difference between winners’ and losers’ 
process assessments has been found to be greater following trial and arbitration than follow-
ing mediation, settlement conference, and bilateral negotiation. See Lind et al., supra note 
101, at 956, 971, 975; Wissler, supra note 10, at 344. 
 158. Female parties: F(1, 303) = 8.42, p < .01; male parties:  F(1, 301) = 3.69, p = .056. 
 159. McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1365-67 (discussing several studies finding that 
most divorce lawyers reduced rather than sparked conflict).  But see Schneider & Mills, 
supra note 94, at 616-17 (finding that, in bilateral negotiation, family practice lawyers were 
more likely to use an ethically adversarial style than lawyers in civil practice, and the two 
groups were about equally likely to use an unethically adversarial style). 
 160. McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1365. 
 161. MATHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 130-31. “The resulting legal framework thus pro-
vided few incentives for divorce lawyers in most cases to try to ‘win big’ for their clients.” 
Id. at 131.  Interviewed lawyers saw their main goal as reaching a settlement fair to both 
sides, and many started negotiations with an offer near what they thought would be a fair 
outcome. Id. at 114-17; see also McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1366-67. 
 162. McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1367.  This study made comparisons between 
Maine, where court-connected mediation had been mandatory for approximately five years, 
and New Hampshire, where there was no court-mandated mediation.  Divorce lawyers in 
Maine, compared to those in New Hampshire, were significantly more likely to agree that 
the goal of negotiation was “reaching a settlement fair to both parties” rather than “getting 
as much as possible for their client.”  And the volume of motions filed in divorce cases 
dropped by 20% in Maine while increasing by 20% to 30% in New Hampshire during the 
same time period.  Id. 
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tion.163  For instance, Kritzer’s research suggests that some of these fac-
tors—repeated contact with opposing counsel and economic incentives fa-
voring efficient resolution—also operate in routine personal injury contin-
gency fee cases to produce a norm of cooperation and reciprocity.164  In 
bilateral negotiations in these cases, most lawyers made initial demands 
and offers that were not extreme and did not employ “scorched earth” tac-
tics, suggesting that a cooperative style predominated.165  In the present 
general civil mediation study, a majority of lawyers (67%) said that oppos-
ing counsel was highly cooperative in mediation, and only 7% said oppos-
ing counsel was uncooperative.166  These findings suggest that, even in 
contexts other than domestic relations, lawyers might not substantially in-
crease the contentiousness of mediation. 
Because virtually all parties are represented in general civil mediation, 
the effect of representation on the tone of mediation cannot be assessed, but 
the effect of how adversarial or cooperative lawyers are during mediation 
can be examined.  Parties in one study were frustrated and dissatisfied 
when their lawyers adopted an adversarial approach in mediation, created a 
win/lose atmosphere, or were reluctant to negotiate.167  In the present study, 
parties’ assessments of mediation on some, but not all, dimensions were 
related to how cooperative their lawyers said opposing counsel was in med-
iation,168 though the relationships generally were small (see Table 3).  
Where opposing counsel was more cooperative, parties felt they had more 
input into the outcome and had a better understanding of their own case and 
the other side’s views, and thought that the mediation process was more 
fair and the mediator had a better understanding of their views.  However, 
                                                          
 163. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 150, at 203-05, 208-09 (noting that lawyers’ 
level of cooperation varies across practice areas as a result of how much opportunity there is 
to develop a reputation for cooperation, such as whether there tend to be opportunities for 
tradeoffs in settlements or whether the size of the legal community permits repeated interac-
tions among the lawyers); Macfarlane, supra note 74, at 315, 318 (finding that differences in 
civil litigators’ approaches to mediation were related to their amount of personal experience 
with mediation and the local legal culture, including the size and cohesiveness of the bar). 
 164. HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION 
PROCESS IN ORDINARY LITIGATION 105, 122, 129, 133 (1991) [hereinafter KRITZER, LET’S 
MAKE A DEAL]; KRITZER, RISK, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS, supra note 151, at 129-31, 
234. 
 165. KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL, supra note 164, at 77, 105, 118-25, 131-33; KRITZER, 
RISK, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS, supra note 151, at 130-31, 153-55.  See also Schneider 
& Mills, supra note 94, at 616 (finding that 68% of lawyers in civil practice, compared to 
61% in family practice, used either a true or a cautious problem-solving approach in bilater-
al negotiations, rather than an adversarial approach). 
 166. Twenty-six percent said opposing counsel was somewhat cooperative. 
 167. Macfarlane & Keet, supra note 68. 
 168. Lawyers were asked to rate “Was the opposing counsel cooperative in the mediation 
of this case?” on a five-point scale, from  “not at all” to “a great deal.” 
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when opposing counsel was more cooperative, parties saw the mediator as 
somewhat less impartial than when opposing counsel was less cooperative.  
And cooperation was not related to parties’ sense of voice, settlement pres-
sure, or respectful treatment by the mediator.  Notably, the more coopera-




Table 3. Relationships Between Lawyers’ Level of Cooperation and Par-
ties’ and Lawyers’ Assessments of General Civil Mediation 
Parties’ Assessments 
Fair process .065* Treated with respect n.s. 
Mediator was impartial -.065+ Not pressured by mediator n.s. 
Chance to tell views n.s. Not pressured by other 
side 
n.s. 
Input into outcome .142*** Understood other’s views .099** 
Mediator understood 
views 
.062* Understood own case .127*** 
Recommend mediation .092* Satisfaction with process .117** 
Lawyers’ Assessments 
Fair process .430*** Mediator effective .335*** 
Mediator impartial .186*** Parties’ relationship .316*** 
Party involvement .308*** Lawyers’ relationship .334*** 
Recommend mediation .330*** Evaluate other’s case .204*** 
Fair settlement .370*** Evaluate own case .182*** 
Notes: Positive Pearson correlation coefficients indicate that more cooperation is associated 
with more favorable assessments; negative coefficients indicate that more cooperation is 
associated with less favorable assessments. 
+ p < .10;  * p < .05;  ** p < .01;  ***p < .001; n.s. = not statistically significant
 
                                                          
 169. r = .253, p < .001.  See also Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 150, at 209 (stating that 
the relationship between opposing counsel has “profound implications” for whether lawyers 
can reduce conflict and facilitate settlement). 
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For lawyers, greater cooperation in mediation from opposing counsel 
was consistently and strongly related to more favorable assessments of 
mediation (see Table 3).170  Notably, lawyers who said opposing counsel 
was more cooperative thought that the mediation process was more fair and 
that the mediator was more impartial, that parties had more involvement in 
resolving the dispute, and that the parties’ relationship improved more than 
did lawyers who faced less cooperative opposing counsel.  Moreover, in 
cases that reached a full or partial settlement in mediation, lawyers thought 
the settlement was more fair when opposing counsel was more cooperative. 
In sum, the limited research findings suggest that the presence of law-
yers neither substantially increased nor decreased the contentiousness of 
mediation, at least in domestic relations cases.  Nonetheless, how the law-
yers interacted during general civil mediation made a difference to the 
mediation process and outcome. When lawyers were less adversarial and 
more cooperative during mediation, the parties, and especially the lawyers, 
generally viewed the process and outcome more favorably, and the case 
was more likely to settle. 
C. What Effect Does Representation Have on Mediation Outcomes? 
1. Does Representation Facilitate or Impede Settlement? 
There are contrasting predictions about the effect that lawyers will have 
on settlement in mediation.  Lawyers’ greater skill and experience with ne-
gotiation could facilitate settlement.171  If lawyers prepare clients for medi-
ation, that could make settlement more likely.172  Lawyers also could in-
crease the likelihood of settlement because they are less likely than parties 
to be susceptible to cognitive biases, and thus are able to help their clients 
overcome cognitive barriers to settlement.173  If lawyers are aggressively 
adversarial and exacerbate the parties’ conflict, that could reduce the like-
lihood of settlement; but if lawyers are cooperative and able to calm their 
clients’ emotions, that could facilitate settlement.174  If lawyers ensure that 
                                                          
 170. It is not clear why the degree of cooperation was more strongly and more consistent-
ly related to lawyers’ than to parties’ assessments.  The correlations between parties’ as-
sessments and cooperation might be attenuated because they involve parties’ ratings of the 
process but lawyers’ ratings of cooperation; perhaps what looked like cooperation to the 
lawyers did not look cooperative to the parties.  Or perhaps parties are less affected than 
lawyers by opposing counsel’s tone. 
 171. See, e.g., MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 132, at 71. 
 172. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 173. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 56, at 320-29; Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, 
Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 77, 79-86 (1997). 
 174. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
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parties’ views are expressed and their concerns are addressed, that could 
encourage settlement; but if they stifle party participation and limit discus-
sions, that could hinder settlement.175  If lawyers buffer settlement pres-
sures from the mediator and the opposing side, and advise their clients to 
reject unfair proposals, the settlement rate might decrease; but lawyers 
themselves might push clients to settle.176 
Settlement was more likely when both parties were unrepresented than 
when both were represented.  One domestic relations mediation study 
found that a full or partial settlement was more likely when neither party 
had a lawyer present during mediation than when one or both parties’ law-
yers attended.177  The present domestic relations study found that full set-
tlement was more likely when neither party (58%) or only one party (56%) 
had a lawyer present in mediation than when both parties had a lawyer 
present (44%).178  Partial settlement, however, was more likely when both 
parties had lawyers present (39%) than when only one party or neither par-
ty had a lawyer present (22% each).179  An EEO mediation study also 
found a similar pattern: the settlement rate was highest when both parties 
were unrepresented, intermediate when only one party was represented, and 
lowest when both parties were represented in mediation.180 
Two other EEO mediation studies that examined the effect of representa-
tion separately for each party found a different effect for charging parties 
than for responding parties.  One study found that charging parties who 
were unrepresented settled at a higher rate than those represented by a law-
yer, but found no differences by representational status for responding par-
                                                          
 175. See infra note 185 and accompanying text; see also Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31, 
at 901. 
 176. See infra notes 204-205 and accompanying text. 
 177. The settlement rate was 75% and 48%, respectively.  Stuart & Savage, supra note 
82.  The findings are based on 307 domestic relations cases mediated in a multi-door court-
house program in 1996 and 1997 in Arapahoe County, Colo. Id. 
 178. χ2(4) = 16.48, p < .01, V = .160.  The rate of non-settlement was similar across re-
presentation groups (17% to 22%). When only one party had a lawyer present, which party’s 
lawyer was present affected the likelihood that full settlement was reached (male party, 
45%; female party, 62%). 
 179. When responses referring to a mediation session other than the final one were in-
cluded in the analysis, 27% of parties whose lawyers were not present scheduled another 
session, presumably so they could consult with their lawyers in the interim, compared to 
only 7% of unrepresented parties and 8% of represented parties whose lawyers were present. 
These findings suggest that the practice of lawyers not attending mediation could add delay 
and expense to the mediation process in some cases by postponing settlement or necessitat-
ing an additional mediation session. 
 180. The settlement rate was 68%, 45%, and 31%, respectively.  MCEWEN, supra note 49, 
at 42-43.  When only one party was represented, the settlement rate was higher when the 
responding party was represented (53%) than when the charging party was represented 
(39%). Id. at 42-43, 50. 
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ties.181  The study involving the mediation of informal EEO complaints 
found that charging parties were more likely to settle when unrepresented 
than when represented by a lawyer, but that the reverse was true for res-
ponding parties.182  Comparing unrepresented parties to parties who had 
non-lawyer representatives showed that, for both charging and responding 
parties, the settlement rate was either about the same or higher for 
represented parties, depending on the type of representative.183  Charging 
parties were less likely to settle when they were represented by a lawyer 
than by other types of representatives; for responding parties, the pattern 
varied depending on the type of non-lawyer representative.  Thus, lawyers 
had a different effect on settlement for charging parties than for responding 
parties, and lawyers had a different effect on settlement than did other types 
of representatives.  These findings suggest that it is something about the 
nature of the representation, not simply having a representative or having a 
legal representative, that affects settlement. 
What might account for the apparent reduction in the likelihood of set-
tlement associated with the presence of lawyers in most studies?  Perhaps 
lawyers advised their clients to reject settlement proposals, so that unrepre-
sented parties accepted more settlement proposals than represented parties. 
Unfortunately, we lack the information needed to explore this possibility, 
namely, the rate at which represented and unrepresented parties received 
and then either accepted or rejected settlement proposals.184  Perhaps the 
presence of lawyers changed the mediation process in ways that in turn re-
duced the likelihood of settlement.  In the present domestic relations med-
iation study, for instance, representation was associated with somewhat less 
improved understanding of the other side’s views and with reduced party 
participation, both of which were related to a lower rate of settlement.185  In 
                                                          
 181. McDermott & Ervin, supra note 82, at 57-59.  The findings of this study are based 
on questionnaires completed by 1,683 charging parties and 1,572 responding parties after 
mediations that were conducted under the supervision of the fifty EEOC field offices during 
a five-month period. Id. at 50-52.  This study did not report the type of representative, but 
presumably most were lawyers since these were formal EEOC complaints. See supra note 
50 and accompanying text. 
 182. The rate of full and partial settlement for charging parties was 62% when unrepre-
sented and 50% when represented by a lawyer.  For responding parties, the settlement rate 
was 63% when unrepresented and 67% when represented by a lawyer. Bingham et al., supra 
note 51, at 365-68. 
 183. For charging parties, the settlement rate was 60% when represented by a fellow 
employee and 65% when represented by the union.  For responding parties, the settlement 
rate was 78% when represented by an association representative and 64% when represented 
by a fellow employee. Id. 
 184. We would need additional information to determine whether lawyers advised clients 
to reject proposals because the proposals were unfair or for other reasons. 
 185. See supra notes 120, 123 and accompanying text.  Participation and settlement, 
r(628) = .123, p < .01; understanding and settlement, r(838) = .234, p < .001. 
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one EEO mediation study, when comparing charging parties who were un-
represented with those represented by a lawyer, the pattern of differences in 
their satisfaction with their level of participation was similar to the pattern 
of differences in their settlement rates.186  But these parallel patterns for 
satisfaction with participation and settlement were not seen for responding 
parties.187  Thus, although a lower settlement rate might in part reflect poss-
ible changes in the mediation process associated with the presence of law-
yers, that does not appear to be the sole explanation. 
Another possible explanation for the apparent reduction in settlement as-
sociated with the presence of lawyers is that case characteristics related to 
settlement are likely to be confounded with parties’ representational status.  
That is, cases in which parties are more likely to seek and to be able to re-
tain a lawyer might have certain characteristics, such as involving larger, 
stronger, or more complex claims, or involving greater contentiousness or 
disparity between positions,188 that tend to reduce the likelihood of settle-
ment.189  EEO mediators rated cases in which both parties had representa-
tion as involving more complex legal issues and a stronger substantive 
                                                          
 186. See supra notes 126, 182 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra notes 126, 182 and accompanying text.  In addition, responding parties 
who had an association representative were least likely to be “very satisfied” with their level 
of participation, but most likely to settle. See supra notes 127, 183 and accompanying text. 
 188. See, e.g., KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY, supra note 3, at 33, 82 (noting that parties 
might be more likely to hire a lawyer in more problematic cases, and lawyers might be more 
likely to take cases with more merit or stronger evidence); KRITZER, RISK, REPUTATIONS, 
AND REWARDS, supra note 151, at 84-85 (finding that lawyers’ decisions whether to take 
cases were strongly influenced by the potential for liability); MACCOBY  & MNOOKIN, supra 
note 154, at 108-12 (noting that parties who were more willing to fight, for whom the out-
come was more important, or whose preferences were more in conflict with the other side’s 
would be more likely to seek legal counsel); SALES ET AL., supra note 3, at 8-12 (finding that 
unrepresented litigants had less complex divorce cases); Bingham et al., supra note 51; 
McDermott & Ervin, supra note 82, at 59; Stuart & Savage, supra note 82.  But see Leandra 
Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice? An Empirical Study 
of Lawyers’ Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1235, 
1261 (2006)  (finding that cases where the taxpayer had a lawyer were weaker overall).  
Similarly, the type of representative that parties choose might be associated with characte-
ristics of the case or with what they want from a representative. See Bingham et al., supra 
note 51, at 354-55. 
 189. See, e.g., Monsma & Lempert, supra note 94, at 630, 642, 661 (noting that any ex-
amination of the effect of representation on case outcomes “must consider how clients ac-
quire or fail to acquire counsel, for outcomes apparently associated with counsel may in fact 
be consequences of factors that led to the acquisition of counsel” and that “case or other 
characteristics may suppress or distort the relationship between legal representation and case 
outcomes”); see also Roselle L. Wissler, The Role of Antecedent and Procedural Characte-
ristics in Mediation: A Review of the Research, in THE BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF MEDIA-
TION:  BRIDGING THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 129, 130-31 (Margaret S. Herrman ed., 
2006) (reviewing research findings on the relationships between case characteristics and 
settlement). 
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showing of discrimination than cases in which one party was represented, 
which in turn were rated as more complex and having more evidence of 
discrimination than cases in which neither party was represented.190  More-
over, the pattern of differences in these case characteristics across represen-
tational status categories was similar to the pattern of settlement rate differ-
ences across representational categories.191  Thus, fewer cases might have 
settled in EEO mediation when both parties were represented because those 
cases involved stronger and more complex claims, not because lawyers 
were present in mediation. 
In the present domestic relations study, several characteristics associated 
with representation also were related to settlement.  Represented parties 
had higher incomes,192 were married for a longer time,193 and were more 
likely to say that they tried to resolve financial issues during mediation 
(e.g., division of property, alimony, debts)194 than unrepresented parties.195  
These case characteristics were related to settlement in a way that largely 
paralleled the relationships between representation and settlement.196  That 
is, cases in which the parties discussed financial issues during mediation,197 
                                                          
 190. MCEWEN, supra note 49, at 43 (concluding that “[i]t is probable that representation 
of parties reflects something about the nature of the charges themselves as well as the orien-
tation of parties toward the charge, one another, and settlement”). 
 191. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 192. r(805) = .184, p < .001.  The parties’ combined representational status also was 
related to their combined income (χ2(8) = 21.33, p < .01; V=.279).  In cases with the highest 
combined income, both parties were most likely to be represented, whereas in cases with the 
lowest combined income, one or both parties were most likely to be unrepresented.  This 
relationship could reflect either the amount at stake or the parties’ ability to pay.  See infra 
note 225 and accompanying text. 
 193. r(839) = .095, p < .01. The parties’ combined representational status, however, was 
not related to the length of their marriage. Length of marriage is an indicator of case com-
plexity, as shorter marriages tend to be associated with no children and less property. See 
SALES ET AL., supra note 3, at 11. 
 194. χ2(1) = 16.25, p < .001, V=.139; represented parties, 38%; unrepresented parties, 
57%.  In this program, all contested issues, including property and financial issues, could be 
resolved.  This relationship could reflect either that parties with disputed financial issues 
were more likely to hire a lawyer, or that having a lawyer led to the identification of finan-
cial issues that the parties otherwise might not have raised.  The parties’ combined represen-
tational status also was related to whether financial issues were discussed in mediation 
(χ2(2) = 24.04, p < .001, V = .193).  Financial issues were more likely to be discussed when 
both parties were represented (54%) than when neither party or one party was represented 
(30% and 34%, respectively). 
 195. Representation was not related to several other potential indices of case complexity:  
the number of factors involved in the case (e.g., stepparents, claims of substance abuse), the 
number of issues relating to the children that the party tried to resolve in mediation, or 
whether there was physical violence and its frequency, recency, or severity. 
 196. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text. 
 197. χ2(2) = 35.71, p < .001, V = .235. 
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had higher incomes,198 and were married longer199 were less likely to reach 
a full settlement, but more likely to reach a partial settlement, than were 
cases in which the parties did not discuss financial issues, had lower in-
comes, or were married fewer years.  A series of additional analyses found 
that the effect of representation on settlement was greatly reduced when 
case characteristics were taken into consideration,200 suggesting that much 
of the observed relationship between representation and settlement was due 
to the effect of case characteristics associated with representation. 
In sum, lawyers’ presence in mediation correlated with a lower rate of 
settlement in most, but not all, studies.  This might reflect some changes in 
the mediation process associated with the presence of lawyers or with how 
lawyers or other representatives conducted their representation during med-
iation.  But the settlement rate might be due as much or more to the effect 
of case characteristics associated with representation than to any impact 
lawyers had on the mediation process. 
2. Does Representation Lead to Better or More Fair Settlements? 
Most of the research that has examined the effect of representation on 
outcomes, often finding better outcomes for represented than unrepresented 
parties, has looked only at trial or administrative hearing decisions.201 By 
contrast, a study of negotiated outcomes found no effect of representation 
on outcomes in settled tax cases.202  Perhaps lawyers play a different role 
in, and have different effects on, case outcomes that result from the parties’ 
agreements rather than from a third-party decision. 
                                                          
 198. χ2(10) = 24.18, p < .01. 
 199. r(307) = -.114, p < .05. 
 200. To briefly summarize the findings of this set of analyses:  When the case characte-
ristics were held constant, representational status did not consistently have a statistically 
significant relationship with settlement, nor did it show the same pattern at all levels of each 
of the case characteristics.  Similarly, when representational status was held constant, the 
case characteristics did not consistently have a statistically significant relationship with 
settlement, nor did they show the same pattern at all levels of representation.  In addition, 
when representational status was added to a multiple regression equation in which case cha-
racteristics had already been entered, representational status added a statistically significant, 
but very small, contribution to explaining settlement over and above the effect of case cha-
racteristics. The same was true when the case characteristics were added to an equation 
containing representational status. 
 201. See generally Engler, supra note 5. 
 202. Lederman & Hrung, supra note 188, at 1239, 1264 (noting their results might sug-
gest that “the same specialized training critical for making a case in court is not required for 
negotiations”). 
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In mediation, lawyers are thought to act “as a crucial check against unin-
formed and pressured settlements.”203  If lawyers discourage their clients 
from agreeing to unfair or unwise proposals, or push the other side to im-
prove their proposals, represented parties would achieve more fair or more 
favorable mediated agreements than unrepresented parties.204  Lawyers, 
however, may not sufficiently understand or value their clients’ interests, or 
they may urge clients to accept or reject proposals that are more in line 
with their own preferences or financial and reputational interests  than with 
those of their clients.  If so, then represented parties would be less likely 
than unrepresented parties to achieve their preferred or optimal outcome.205 
In some jurisdictions and mediation contexts, mediators may educate 
parties about the consequences of settlement proposals or have a duty to 
raise questions about the fairness of proposals and to terminate mediation if 
they feel the settlement would be unconscionable.206  To the extent that 
                                                          
 203. NAT’L STANDARDS, supra note 17, §§ 1.4, 11.3 & cmts.; see also, COOLEY, supra 
note 73, at 49; MACFARLANE, supra note 61, at 216-18; Ross Dolloff & Patricio Rossi, Med-
iation Project Gets Results for North Shore Tenants, 16 LEGAL SERVICES REP. 1, 11-12 
(May 2006); McDermott & Ervin, supra note 82; McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1327, 
1360-61; Reuben, supra note 3, at 1098; Stuart & Savage, supra note 82. 
 204. See, e.g., MATHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 98 (finding that lawyers repeatedly asked 
clients to reconsider settlement offers that might sell them short); KRITZER, RISK, REPUTA-
TIONS, AND REWARDS, supra note 151, at 158-59 (finding that lawyers did not grab offers 
minimally acceptable to their clients, but instead pushed the opposing side). 
 205. See KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL, supra note 164, at 64, 99-100, 123; MNOOKIN ET 
AL., supra note 132; DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO’S IN CHARGE? 115 
(1974); AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS: 
POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 110 (1995); Lederman & Hrung, supra note 
188, at 1244; Nolan-Haley, supra note 108, at 1381; Relis, supra note 108, at 706, 734, 742-
43; Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31, at 896; Sternlight, supra note 56, at 318, 320-28.  Stu-
dies of lawyers’ interactions with clients during the course of litigation find that lawyers 
shape and reframe their clients’ expectations and goals and use many strategies to persuade 
their clients to accept their recommendations. See KRITZER, supra note 151, at 119-28, 170-
76; MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 154, at 109 (finding that parents who said they 
wanted sole custody were nonetheless more likely to request joint legal custody when they 
had a lawyer than when they did not); MACFARLANE, supra note 61, at 61; MATHER ET AL., 
supra note 3, at 96-99; ROSENTHAL, supra, at 109, 111;. SARAT & FELSTINER, supra, at 106-
11, 122-25; Lynn Mather, What Do Clients Want? What Do Lawyers Do? 52 EMORY L.J. 
1065, 1070 (2003); Relis, supra note 108, at 734-41; Sternlight, supra note 56, at 318. But 
see Relis, supra note 108, at 706, 727, 734-37, 740-42 (finding that although over time some 
plaintiffs talked less about non-monetary aims and came to see money as a way to express 
those aims, plaintiffs nonetheless retained non-monetary objectives even after years in liti-
gation).  Seeking to transform non-monetary disputes into monetary terms might be particu-
larly likely when lawyers have a contingency fee arrangement. See, e.g., KRITZER, LET’S 
MAKE A DEAL, supra note 164, at 21-24, 45-46. 
 206. See, e.g., ABA MODEL DIVORCE MEDIATION STANDARDS, supra note 60, §§ XI, 25.4 
(“[A] family mediator shall suspend or terminate the mediation process” when “the partici-
pants are about to enter into an agreement that the mediator reasonably believes to be un-
conscionable.”); see also NAT’L STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 8.1.f & cmts.; ROBERT A. 
BARUCH BUSH, THE DILEMMAS OF MEDIATION PRACTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICAL DILEMMAS 
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mediators are permitted or required to take these actions, and do so effec-
tively, lack of representation might have a reduced effect on mediation out-
comes, or at least egregiously unfair settlements might be prevented.207 
The effect of representation on parties’ assessments of the agreement 
reached in mediation varied across studies.  In the present study of domes-
tic relations mediation, representation was not related to parties’ satisfac-
tion with the agreement or to their views that the agreement was evenly 
balanced.208  A study of EEO mediation also found no relationship between 
representation and parties’ satisfaction with the mediated outcome.209  A 
study of special education mediation, however, found that parents who 
were unrepresented or who had a lay advocate in mediation thought the 
mediated agreement was less fair than did parents who had a lawyer in 
mediation.210  Perhaps the latter study found differences because the parties 
completed the questionnaire after more time had passed since mediation 
(i.e., from one to twenty months later rather than at the end of the session, 
as in the domestic relations study),211 giving them more time to reflect on 
the agreement.212  Or perhaps the impact of having a lawyer was greater in 
this context because the opposing party was always represented by a law-
yer,213 which was less often the case in other mediation contexts.  Impor-
tantly, parties who thought their representative (lawyer or lay advocate) 
                                                                                                                                      
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 13-19 (1992); Lande, supra note 11, at 878; McEwen et al., su-
pra note 2, at 1332-33, 1397-98, 1405-06; Nolan-Haley, supra note 17, at 811, 836. 
 207. See McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1333-34, 1391. 
 208. This was true when looking at the individual and the combined representational 
status of the parties.  Most parties who settled were satisfied with the final outcome of med-
iation (83%) and felt the agreement was pretty evenly balanced (77%).  All parties who said 
the outcome was not balanced thought it favored them; none thought it favored the other 
side. 
 209. Varma & Stallworth, supra note 84, at 402-03.  The mean ratings were 3.27 and 
3.24 for unrepresented and represented parties, respectively.  The authors did not report 
statistical significance tests, but this is unlikely to be a true difference. 
 210. Kuriloff & Goldberg, supra note 53, at 55. 
 211. Id. at 45 n.59.  There was an additional methodological difference, namely, the use 
of a scale comprised of fifteen items about the agreement, some of which might have tapped 
different aspects of parties’ views of the agreement and, thus, might have produced different 
responses than the single measures of outcome fairness used in other studies.  The scale 
included such items as whether mediation helped the parents get what they wanted for their 
child, whether the agreement was worth the emotional costs, whether the agreement reflect-
ed their child’s situation, and whether they felt pressured to settle.  Id. at 47-48. 
 212. See also Hannaford-Agor & Mott, supra note 4, at 179-80 (suggesting that it might 
be better to examine parties’ assessments of the outcomes at some time after resolution); 
Dean G. Pruitt, Process and Outcome in Community Mediation, 11 NEGOTIATION. J. 365, 
373 (1995) (finding no relationship between parties’ satisfaction immediately after media-
tion and several months later). 
 213. Kuriloff & Goldberg, supra note 53, at 56. 
WISSLER_CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:55 PM 
2010] REPRESENTATION IN MEDIATION 465 
was more “effective” thought the agreement reached was more fair.214  This 
latter finding suggests that characteristics of the representatives or how 
they conducted their representation might affect parties’ assessments of 
mediation outcomes. 
It is difficult to interpret findings regarding the effect of representation 
on parties’ satisfaction with the agreement without knowing something 
about the nature of the settlement proposals that were exchanged and the 
relative rate at which parties in the different representational groups ac-
cepted or rejected those proposals.  The lack of differences in parties’ satis-
faction with the agreement could indicate that unrepresented parties were 
as likely as represented parties to detect and reject unfair proposals, so that 
the final agreements reached by both groups were equally fair.  But the lack 
of differences in party satisfaction could instead mask actual differences in 
the final agreements if unrepresented parties were unable to accurately as-
sess the fairness of proposals and accepted “objectively unfair” proposals 
they viewed as fair,215 while represented parties accepted only “objectively 
fair” proposals as a result of their lawyers’ advice.  Also, more favorable 
ratings by represented parties could reflect either that they obtained better 
agreements, or that their lawyers lowered their expectations and convinced 
them the agreements were good.216  Or more favorable ratings by 
represented parties could reflect that criteria other than fairness, such as 
economic pressures and the need to end the case quickly, played a smaller 
role in their decisions to accept a proposed settlement than they did for un-
represented parties.217  Parties in the present general civil mediation study 
rated the agreement as less fair than their lawyers did,218 which suggests 
that parties did not over-rate the fairness of agreements and were not per-
suaded to share their lawyers’ views. 
                                                          
 214. This was true both for parents (r = .38) and for school officials (r = .49). Id. at 57.  
See supra note 100 for a description of the “effectiveness” scale. 
 215. See, e.g., Tyler, supra note 88. 
 216. See, e.g., KRITZER, RISK, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS, supra note 151, at 120-72; 
SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 205, at 111; David Luban, The Quality of Justice, 66 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 381, 405-06 (1989); Sternlight, supra note 56, at 318.  Some evidence suggests 
that it is unlikely that lawyers are able to convince clients that agreements satisfy their ob-
jectives when they in fact do not. See, e.g., Relis, supra note 108, at 706, 727, 734-35; 
Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31, at 882. 
 217. Several studies have found that other factors and pressures, such as the inability to 
afford added delay or costs, risk preferences, and impatience to finalize the divorce or the 
lack of emotional stamina to hold out, were more important in parties’ decisions to settle 
than were considerations of fairness. See, e.g., KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL, supra note 
164, at 137-38; Erlanger et al., supra note 102, at 585, 592, 594, 600; MACFARLANE, supra 
note 61, at 220; MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 132, at 100-01, 106. 
 218. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation, supra note 32, at 667. 
WISSLER_AUTHOR 3/12/2010  1:55 PM 
466 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
Two studies examined more “objective” outcome measures.  One study 
found that represented parties in housing court mediation were more likely 
than unrepresented parties to have the eviction “unconditionally or tempo-
rarily denied subject to a probationary period” and to get more time to look 
for another place to live.219  The second study found that settlements in 
EEO mediation involved smaller dollar amounts when charging parties 
were unrepresented than when they were represented by a lawyer or other 
person, but found no differences in settlement amounts depending on 
whether responding parties were represented or unrepresented.220 
There are several reasons why it is impossible to draw conclusions about 
the effect of representation on settlement outcomes by looking only at the 
absolute dollar amount of the settlement, as in the latter study.  First, with-
out taking into consideration the charging parties’ claim or the amount in 
dispute,221 one cannot tell whether smaller settlement amounts simply re-
flect smaller underlying claims, or whether the settlements in fact comprise 
a smaller proportion of the claimed or disputed amount.222  Second, focus-
ing only on dollar amounts overlooks the non-monetary objectives and set-
tlement provisions that are present in a substantial proportion of cases,223 
                                                          
 219. Dolloff & Rossi, supra note 203, at 14.  It is not clear whether the outcome data 
reported involved only mediated agreements, which is how most cases were resolved, or 
also included trial judgments. Id. at 12.    
 220. E. Patrick McDermott & Ruth Obar, “What’s Going On” in Mediation: An Empiri-
cal Analysis of the Influence of a Mediator’s Style on Party Satisfaction and Monetary 
Benefit, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 75, 102-05 (2004).  These findings are based on question-
naires completed by mediators and parties in 645 cases following mediation conducted un-
der the supervision of the fifty EEOC field offices during a five-month period in 2000. Id. at 
90-92.  The study did not distinguish among different types of representatives, did not ex-
amine the effect of the combined representational status of both parties, and did not take into 
consideration non-monetary settlement provisions. Id. at 101 n.109. 
 221. See, e.g., KRITZER, JUSTICE BROKER, supra note 3, at 143-44, 147, 149 (noting that 
“success should be evaluated in terms of what is really at stake,” namely, the amount in 
dispute); Lederman & Hrung, supra note 188, at 1239 (using the proportion of tax at issue 
that was recovered by the IRS as the measure of “financial outcome”). See generally Neil 
Vidmar, The Small Claims Court: A Reconceptualization of Disputes and an Empirical 
Investigation, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 151 (1984) (arguing that outcomes must be assessed 
relative to the amount in dispute, which takes into consideration both the amount of the 
plaintiff’s claim and the amount, if any, for which the respondent acknowledges liability). 
 222. Non-monetary outcomes also need to be assessed relative to what the parties were 
seeking.  For instance, it is not surprising that joint legal custody was more likely to be the 
outcome when at least one party had a lawyer, given that represented parties were more 
likely to request joint legal custody than were unrepresented parties. See MACCOBY & 
MNOOKIN, supra note 154.  That study also illustrated why the outcome needs to be assessed 
in the context of what both sides are seeking (which is comparable to the “amount in dis-
pute”): parties were more likely to get the custody outcome they wanted when the other 
party did not contest it than when they did. Id. at 103-04. 
 223. See MCEWEN, supra note 49, at 52, 55; Wissler, supra note 32, at 667; Bingham et 
al., supra note 51, at 372-73; Relis, supra note 108, at 702, 725. 
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and thus can give a misleading picture of the outcome.  For parties primari-
ly interested in non-monetary remedies, even a substantial monetary out-
come might not be seen as satisfactory;224 they might prefer no money or a 
smaller monetary settlement in exchange for key non-monetary settlement 
provisions.  Importantly, both the size of the initial claim and whether it 
includes non-monetary components are likely to be confounded with repre-
sentational status: parties with less money at issue and parties with primari-
ly non-monetary goals are less likely to seek or to be able to hire a law-
yer.225  Accordingly, unrepresented parties might attain smaller monetary 
settlements as a result of their underlying claims and goals rather than their 
lack of representation.226   
Examining the content of agreements “objectively” presents additional 
challenges of what standard to apply to evaluate the outcome.  Studies find 
great variability among lawyers in the “objectively proper” monetary value 
they assign to the same case.227  And when parties’ objectives and agree-
ments involve non-monetary components or encompass a number of issues 
of varying importance, it can be especially difficult to evaluate how favor-
able or fair the outcome is for each party.228 
This discussion illustrates the difficulty of examining the effect of repre-
sentation on mediation outcomes, whether using parties’ assessments of the 
agreement or the agreements themselves.  This is particularly true given the 
variation in parties’ objectives and the considerations that influence their 
decisions to accept or reject settlement proposals, and the confounding of 
those objectives and considerations with representational status. 
CONCLUSION 
The available empirical research findings suggest that the problems un-
represented parties face in mediation, or conversely, the benefits of having 
counsel, might not be as great as some claim.  For the most part, unrepre-
sented parties do not see the mediation process as less fair, the mediator as 
                                                          
 224. See, e.g., Riskin & Welsh, supra note 31, at 880-82. 
 225. See, e.g., KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL, supra note 164, at 102, 155 (finding that 
contingency fee lawyers were unlikely to take cases with a likely non-monetary outcome); 
KRITZER, RISK, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS, supra note 151, at 84-85 (noting that low 
damages or inadequate fee potential was a major reason lawyers declined to take cases). 
 226. See Monsma & Lempert, supra note 94, at 630, 642. 
 227. See, e.g., NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY 234-35 
(1995); Marc Galanter, The Quality of Settlements, 1988 J. DISP. RESOL. 55, 76-77; Neil 
Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical Negli-
gence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883, 898, 901 
(1993). 
 228. See generally Engler, supra note 5.  See also Hannaford-Agor & Mott, supra note 4, 
at 178-79. 
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less impartial, the pressure to settle as greater, or the settlement as less fair 
than do represented parties.  Studies that find differences in parties’ as-
sessments of the fairness of the mediation process do not find a consistent 
pattern of unrepresented parties viewing the process either as less fair or 
more fair than parties with lawyers.  Although greater party preparation is 
associated with settlement and more favorable assessments of mediation, 
this presumed advantage of representation often is not attained because 
lawyers do not routinely prepare their clients for mediation.  However, 
there is some evidence that represented parties might obtain better out-
comes than unrepresented parties, though the research highlights the chal-
lenge of defining “better” outcomes, especially in light of widely varying 
party goals. 
The research also suggests that lawyers’ presence in mediation might not 
create some of the problems feared.  Lawyers do not appear to be asso-
ciated with more contentious mediation sessions or with more limited dis-
cussions of feelings or settlement options.  Representation is not consistent-
ly associated with parties feeling that they have fewer opportunities to ex-
press their views.  However, how much parties participate in mediation or 
how satisfied they are with their level of participation generally is lower 
when parties have a lawyer in mediation, and there is somewhat less im-
provement in represented parties’ understanding of the other side’s views.  
In addition, lawyers’ presence in mediation generally is associated with a 
lower rate of settlement, although that appears to be due as much or more 
to the effect of case characteristics associated with representation than to 
any impact lawyers might have on the mediation process. 
Existing empirical research, however, is too limited in several respects to 
be able to conclude that lawyers either play an essential role in mediation 
or are not needed, or that they are particularly helpful or detrimental to the 
mediation process.  First, the findings are based on a small number of med-
iation programs in a few contexts.  Mediation programs for different types 
of cases and in different jurisdictions differ in many ways, including the 
characteristics of the parties, the characteristics of the mediators, the model 
or style of mediation, whether mediation is voluntary or mandatory, the 
typical length and number of mediation sessions, and the legal context and 
local legal culture within which they operate.229  There also are differences 
                                                          
 229. See supra Part I.A; supra note 91. See, e.g., Craig McEwen, Examining Mediation in 
Context: Toward Understanding Variations in Mediation Programs, in THE BLACKWELL 
HANDBOOK OF MEDIATION:  BRIDGING THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 81, 87-91 (Mar-
garet S. Herrman ed., 2006) [hereinafter Mediation Context]; Macfarlane, supra note 74, at 
250-51, 313-16; McEwen et al., supra note 2, at 1353, 1362; Craig A. McEwen, Toward a 
Program-Based ADR Research Agenda, 15 NEGOTIATION J. 325, 331-33 (1999) [hereinafter 
Research Agenda]; Wissler, supra note 11, at 56-57, 62-64, 71-72. 
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across mediation contexts and jurisdictions in lawyers’ views of the media-
tion process, the appropriate role of lawyers, and the types of issues and 
solutions relevant for discussion.  These views influence how lawyers 
“use” mediation and how they represent clients during mediation.230  Any 
of these differences in the nature of “mediation” or “representation” in oth-
er mediation programs and contexts could produce different effects on par-
ties’ mediation experience and outcomes.231 
Second, studies to date have examined only a small number of measures, 
some of which are at a relatively general level or assess effects indirectly.  
Systematic observations of mediation sessions and measures that assess in 
more detail the content and tone of the discussions as well as the nature of 
party and lawyer participation during mediation might find that there are 
additional differences associated with the presence of lawyers.232  Third, 
some of the apparent effects of representation might instead reflect under-
lying party or case characteristics associated with seeking and being able to 
obtain representation.233  Ultimately, the random assignment of lawyers to 
parties is needed to be able to address these confounds.  Increasing the 
availability of volunteer lawyers or providing counsel at public expense 
could supply an opportunity for random assignment of lawyers to parties 
that would not otherwise exist: if there are not enough lawyers for all unre-
presented parties, lawyers could be randomly assigned to some parties but 
not others.234 
Fourth, most of the studies are based on mediation sessions that took 
place a decade or more ago.  Since then, lawyers are likely to have had 
more experience representing clients in mediation and possibly have had 
more training in mediation advocacy.235  Several studies suggest that law-
yers who have more experience as counsel in mediation approach the 
process differently than lawyers with less experience: they tend to prepare 
their clients more, have a broader conception of relevant issues and options, 
                                                          
 230. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Mediation Context, supra note 
229, at 88-89; Macfarlane supra note 74, at 250-51, 270-76, 315-18. 
 231. See supra notes 96, 117, 159-66 and accompanying text. 
 232. See, e.g., Relis, supra note 108, at 725-27, 733-34, 742-43; Riskin & Welsh, supra 
note 31, at 864-66, 871-76, 894-97. 
 233. See supra notes 188-91, 200 and accompanying text. 
 234. See Seron et al., supra note 2, at 423-25 (describing how unrepresented parties in 
housing court cases, who met federal poverty guidelines and were interested in having legal 
representation, were randomly assigned either to receive assistance from a volunteer lawyer 
or were told that it was not possible to provide a lawyer). 
 235. See, e.g., Suzanne J. Schmitz, What Should We Teach in ADR Courses?: Concepts 
and Skills for Lawyers Representing Clients in Mediation, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 189, 
206-10 (2001) (noting the need for more training in law school focused on representing 
clients in mediation rather than being the mediator); Welsh, supra note 80, at 24. 
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have greater comfort with and appreciation of client involvement, and 
adopt a less adversarial and more problem-solving approach during the ses-
sion.236  Other evidence, however, suggests that lawyers have become more 
adversarial in bilateral negotiation over the past several decades,237 and that 
some lawyers might use their increased familiarity with mediation to en-
gage in strategic behavior during mediation.238  Some parties might also 
have gained familiarity or experience with mediation, and as a result they 
might have different expectations of the mediation process and of their 
lawyers than they would have had a decade ago.  In some settings, the me-
diators’ approach and the mediation process might have been “trans-
formed” over time to accommodate lawyers’ preferences.239  Accordingly, 
compared to prior studies, research conducted today might find different 
effects of representation in some or all mediation contexts or might find 
divergence in the effects of representation among different subgroups of 
lawyers. 
An important additional area for future research is examining the effect 
of how representation is carried out.240  Existing research suggests that the 
effect that “representation” has on parties’ assessments of mediation and on 
the likelihood of settlement varies with the nature of that representation, 
including how much lawyers prepare their clients for mediation and how 
cooperative lawyers are during mediation.  Research needs to examine 
what other components of representation make a difference to parties’ med-
iation experience and what specific elements of each component contribute 
to its effects.  Understanding more about what lawyers do when 
representing clients in mediation, and how that enhances or detracts from 
the parties’ mediation experience, will provide guidance on how to improve 
the effectiveness of representation in mediation. 
In particular, additional research needs to examine how to structure and 
balance the participation of lawyers and parties to ensure that parties feel 
they have the chance to fully express their views.  Virtually all parties who 
participate a great deal in mediation feel they have considerable chance to 
express their views.  Among parties who do not participate at all, a substan-
tial number nonetheless feel that they have a chance to express their views, 
but not all do.  This suggests that parties can feel they have voice through 
                                                          
 236. See Macfarlane, supra note 74, at 274, 276, 295, 297, 300, 320; McEwen et al.,  
supra note 2, at 1367-78. 
 237. See Schneider & Mills, supra note 94, at 613. 
 238. See Macfarlane, supra note 74, at 256-57. 
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their lawyers, and that it might be something about the way in which their 
lawyers represent them in mediation that affects their sense of voice.  Par-
ties who feel they have more opportunities to express their views are more 
likely to think the process and outcome are fair than are parties who do not 
feel they have a chance to express their views.  Studies need to examine 
what it is that lawyers can do to facilitate parties’ participation and to en-
sure that parties feel their views are expressed, even if they choose not to 
participate.  Ultimately, future research that examines the ways in which 
representation in mediation can be conducted most effectively, as well as 
the circumstances under which parties might be unable to represent them-
selves in mediation, is likely to provide more useful information than stu-
dies that examine the effect of representation more broadly.241 
                                                          
 241. Id.  For a discussion of standards or tests for determining competency to self-
represent in mediation, see GREACEN, supra note 2, at 8-9; Connie J. A. Beck & Lynda E. 
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